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Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication
Daniel A. Crane*

Abstract
Antitrust law is moving away from rules (ex ante, limitedfactor liability
determinants) and toward standards (ex post, multi-factor liability
determinants). This movement has importantconsequencesforthe structure
of antitrustadjudication,including shifting ultimate decision-making down
the legal hierarchy (in the direction ofjuries, trial courts sitting as factfinders, and administrative agencies) and increasing the importance of
economic experts. The efficiency consequences of this trend are often
negative. Specifying liability determinants as open-ended, unpredictable
standards increases litigation costs, chills socially beneficial industrial
practices,allocatesdecisionmakingon microeconomicpolicy to unqualified
juries, andfacilitatesstrategicmisuse of antitrustlitigation by rent-seeking
competitors. Instead offollowing a generalizedpreferencefor standards,
courts should considerfive factors in choosing the ex ante precision of
liability determinants: (1) whether the lawsuit was brought by the
government or a privateparty; (2) whether the legal determinant would
create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is
prospective (i.e., injunctive) orretrospective(i.e., damages); (4) whether the
conduct is idiosyncraticor paradigmatic;and (5) whether the misconduct
alleged is collusion or exclusion.
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. Introduction
Antitrust law finds itself in the midst of a creeping transition from rules to
standards. Adjudicatory categories that have long held sway-such as the
dichotomy between the per se rule and the rule of reason for collaborative
conduct or categorical rules of liability and immunity in monopolization laware progressively being replaced by a multi-factor, ex post approach to antitrust
adjudication. As antitrust has become de-politicized and de-ideologized,
flexible technocratic expertise has replaced legalist conceptualism. Once the
stars of the antitrust courtroom, lawyers now play the supporting cast to
economists. Economic theory and post-hoc, contextual examination of facts,
rather than a priorilegal categories, take center stage in antitrust proceedings.
Gone are the days when the Supreme Court advocated stark antitrust rules and
condemned "rambl[ing] through the wilds of economic theory in order to
maintain a flexible approach."' The wilds are being tamed, and adjudicatory
flexibility favored.
Why this transition? The Chicago School's dramatic influence on antitrust
law since the mid- 1970s accounts for a significant part of the story. Economic
theory has rehabilitated practices once condemned as per se illegal because
courts thought it a waste of time to see whether that conduct might be justified
1.

United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 569, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
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by efficiency considerations. 2 Full-blown review of the context and motivation
of practices once viewed as necessarily anticompetitive often reveals that they
are competitively benign.
Yet the move toward greater adjudicatory
flexibility-the move from rules to standards-cannot be attributed solely to a
less interventionist preference. In recent years, the growing inclination toward
fulsome review of the facts has led a number of courts to reject bright-line rules
that would have immunized defendants from liability. In monopolization cases
in particular, prominent decisions have emphasized the need to consider the
fullness of the defendant's conduct on a case-by-case basis, thus denying
defendants the sort of categorical legal rules most helpful for avoiding jury
trials. 4 It appears that the move toward standards has been motivated in part by
a sense that antitrust cases are too complex and socially important to turn on
simplistic legalist commands.
If history is a reliable teacher, the pendulum will eventually swing back
toward rules. Morris Cohen once noted that "periodic waves of reform during
which the sense ofjustice, natural law, or equity introduces life and flexibility
2. See Richard A. Posner, The ChicagoSchool ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv.
925, 925 (1979) (arguing that the distinctions between the "Chicago" school and other schools
of antitrust theory have greatly diminished as a result of the maturing of economics as a social
science and a growing consensus between the schools of thought on antitrust issues). The
Supreme Court has described its per se approach in antitrust as "reflect[ing] broad
generalizations holding true in so many cases that inquiry into whether they apply to the case at
hand would be needless and wasteful." Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81,
92-93 (2002).
3. For example, vertical maximum resale price setting by upstream firms was once
condemned as per se unlawful. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (stating
that "resale price fixing is a per se violation of the law whether done by agreement or
combination"). In 1997, the Supreme Court held that Albrecht had been mistaken and that the
flexible rule of reason should apply instead. See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997)
(describing the criticisms of the Albrecht decision). Since State Oil, plaintiffs appear to have
had a hard time establishing that maximum retail price setting has anticompetitive effects. See,
e.g., Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a
claim for maximum resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act because the
plaintiffs did not plead a viable relevant market). Similarly, the Supreme Court once believed
that tying could "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition," Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), but subsequent learning has
shown that tying has many procompetitive purposes. See Benjamin Klein, Tying, in III THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW

630 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)

(describing tying generally and providing several explanations as to why firms engage in tying);
David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive MarketsandImplicationsforTying Law, 22 YALE J.REG. 37,41-42 (2005) (noting
that firms in competitive markets may find it efficient to tie products when they can economize
on fixed costs or realize product-specific scale economics).
4. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (noting that appellate courts have
indicated that rules are insufficient to resolve extraordinary conduct cases.).
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into the law and makes it adjustable to its work" are often followed by periods
where "under the social demand for certainty, equity gets hardened and reduced
to rigid rules. 5 Similarly, Carol Rose has documented a tendency in property
law to "shift back and forth between hard-edged, yes-or-no crystalline rules and
discretion-laden, post hoc muddy rules."6 Whatever the perceived advantages
of standards over rules in antitrust, the disadvantages of standards will probably
induce a counter-movement back toward rules once the current movement has
run its course.
This is not to say that a rules-standards-rules-standards cycle is inevitable.
Certain fields lend themselves primarily to rules (tax comes to mind)7 and
others lend themselves more to standards (constitutional law comes to mind,
although less obviously).8 Other fields settle on a mixture between rules and
standards, thus preventing "crystals and mud" cycles. 9 There is wisdom in
seeking such balance. As Richard Posner has aptly observed, "no sensible
person supposes that rules are always superior to standards, or vice versa."'10
Antitrust law is a good case in point. Neither a completely rule-based nor a
standard-based juridical structure would adequately promote competitive and
efficient economic markets.
This Article argues against wholesale abandonment of rules in antitrust,
which appears to be where prevailing currents are taking us. Part of the
argument follows familiar lines from the "rules versus standards" literature,"
5. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 261 (1933).
6. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in PropertyLaw, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577,590 (1988).
7. See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 859, 866-68 (1982) (reviewing the Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts by Boris
I. Bittker).
8. But see Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaws as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178-81 (1989) (exploring the dichotomy between the "general rule of law" and the "discretion
to do justice").
9. See Rose, supra note 6, at 590-97 (offering three tentative explanations of why
property law has oscillated back and forth between "crystalline rules" and "post hoc, muddy
rules").
10. MindGames, Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000).
11. There is a litany of leading generalist literature on the "rules versus standards"
question. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 541 (1987) (arguing that despite many superficial similarities between the English and American
legal systems, they differ in the respect that the English system is more inclined to formalism,
and the American system is more inclined toward substantive considerations); KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-157 (1969) (examining
discretionary power in the administrative context); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 21-128

(1995) [hereinafter SIMPLE RULES] (arguing for a simplification of law

by favoring formal rules in many different contexts); HENRY M. HART&

ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
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LEGAL PROCESS 155-58 (tent. ed. 1958); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITCAL LEGAL STUDIES
15-63 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990) (examining
the ways in which judges make decisions and arguing for ajurisprudence based on pragmatism
rather than rigid formalism); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4871 (1922) (describing the philosophic foundations of Anglo-American law); FREDERICK
SCHAUER,

PLAYING BY THE RULES:

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED

DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 17-31 (1991) (describing rules as "crude probabilistic
generalizations" that may lead to suboptimal or even plainly erroneous decisions); ROBERTO
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 88-100 (1975) (describing the difference between legal
justice, meaning rules, and substantive justice, meaning standards); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 71-79 (1983) (examining rigidity and
precision of rules in the administrative context and using the norm of efficiency as a guide for
the proper degree of precision for administrative rules); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-29 (1967) (distinguishing between principles and rules in
order to explain the important role of standards that are not rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 272-80 (1974)
(discussing the situations in which greater specificity of rules would be the more efficient choice
as well as those situations in which greater generality would be more efficient); Jason S.
Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 256-59
(1995) (analyzing how a definite, ex ante entitlement regime affects the efficiency of two party
sequential bargaining under incomplete information as opposed to a contingent, ex post
entitlement); Louis Kaplow, A Model of Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 150, 152-58 (1995) (modeling the effects of complexity on individuals' decisions to
acquire information, choices about whether to act, and reports of actions to enforcement
authority); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
571-86 (1992) [hereinafter Rules Versus Standards] (offering an economic analysis of rules
versus standards by examining how the choice between rules and standards affects costs and
individual behavior, how such considerations affect rule and standard formulation, and what
level of detail with which laws should be formulated and applied); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1741-76 (1976) (examining
two opposed rhetorical modes in private law opinions, which the author calls "individualism"
and "altruism," and how altruist views lead to a preference for standards and individualist views
lead to a preference for rules); Russell B. Korobkin, BehavioralAnalysis and Legal Form:
Rules vs. StandardsRevisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23, 43-57 (2000) (analyzing whether rules or
standards are preferable in different circumstances from a law and behavioral sciences
perspective by relaxing the assumption of rational choice theory); Anthony I. Ogus,
QuantitativeRules and JudicialDecision Making, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210
(Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchyof Sources and
Forms in Different Systems ofLaw, 7 TUL. L. REv. 475,482-87 (1933) (examining and defining
the differences between five types of authoritative law, rules, principles, conceptions, doctrines,
and standards); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 101, 107-16 (1997) (comparing the economic literature on rules and standards to the
economic approach to social norms while considering the political ideal of the rule of law);
Pierre J. Schlag, Rules andStandards,33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383-420 (1985) (examining the
form and rhetoric of the rules versus standards debate); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 57-95 (1992) (arguing that in the 1991 term, the
Supreme Court split most commonly over the rules versus standards debate even when the
substance of its cases seemed more politically charged); Cass R. Sunstein, Problemswith Rules,
83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 956-57 (1995) (examining the dilemmas posed by both "rules and
rulelessness" and arguing that ways to avoid the problems include "a presumption in favor of
privately adaptable rules, a recognition of legitimate rule revision, and highly contextualized
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such as the trade-offs between precision and predictability and the costs of
promulgating legal commands based on the frequency of the regulated conduct.
But antitrust has unique features-such as the treble damages remedy, the close
proximity of socially beneficial and harmful behavior, and the propensity of
competitors to misuse antitrust lawsuits for strategic advantage-that require an
expanded set of considerations when it comes to the precision of liability
determinants. Given the peculiarities of antitrust, the optimal choice between
rules and standards depends on a variety of factors. This Article identifies five
such factors that should influence the choice between rules and standards as to
different types of industrial behavior and different types of proceedings and
parties. In rough order of importance, they are: (1) whether the lawsuit was
brought by the government or a private party; (2) whether the legal determinant
would create liability or immunize against it; (3) whether the remedy sought is
prospective (i.e., injunctive) or retrospective (i.e., damages); (4) whether the
conduct is idiosyncratic or paradigmatic; and (5) whether the misconduct
alleged is collusion or exclusion. A standard-based approach is most
appropriate to create liability in public litigation seeking injunctive relief
against an idiosyncratic practice. A rule-based approach is most appropriate
when used to immunize archetypal forms of industrial behavior from private
actions for damages.
Part I of this Article summarizes the progression that antitrust law has
made, and is making, from a system mixing rules and standards to one in which
rules are increasingly disfavored and standards favored. Part II asks whether
rules are really possible or whether even those legal commands framed as rules
inevitably dissolve into standards. It concludes that, in antitrust at least,
important consequences follow from the designation of liability and
adjudicative criteria as either rules or standards. Part III considers the
efficiency implications of antitrust rules and standards. It argues for an
approach sensitive to the nature of the plaintiff (i.e., public or private) and the
nature of the remedy sought (i.e., injunction or damages) and to whether the
legal expression would create or prevent liability. Finally, Part IV considers
some non-efficiency based criteria for choosing between rules and standards,
such as ideologically oriented objections to either rules or standards and the
value of maintaining a short set of foundational antitrust rules in order to
maintain the expressive core of antitrust law and orient the public toward the
meaning of this often ill-understood enterprise.

assessments of the virtues of and pathologies of both options").

RULES VERSUS STANDARDS IN ANTITRUST ADJUDICATION

55

II. From Rules to Standards
Antitrust law has never been, and could not be, an exclusively rule-based
system.12 It governs too vast and complex an array of business practices to be
reduced to a handful of categorical rules. Yet rules-specifications of liability
criteria in formal, seemingly precise, and usually short directives13-have made
up a significant part of antitrust law for a good bit of the Sherman Act's
interpretive history. In the not too distant past, it was possible to describe much
of antitrust law in categorical terms, both in terms of what was categorically
prohibited and what was categorically allowed.
This is changing, although not primarily through Supreme Court
leadership. The Rehnquist Court was largely uninterested in antitrust, granting
certiorari in few antitrust cases that raised issues of substance. 14 In the few
12. Richard Epstein imagines the possibility of antitrust fitting within his preferred
paradigm of a few simple rules for a complex world. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 123-27. As
discussed below in Part V.A, however, what Epstein imagines is not so much rule-based
antitrust as it is much less antitrust.
13. I do not mean to try and add to the jurisprudential debate over what is a rule and what
is a standard. The general properties of liability criteria that are more rule-like (do not drive
over 55 miles an hour; pay at a marginal rate of 33%; a Senator must be 35 years old) and
standards (good faith; negligence; unconscionability; undue burden; proportionality) are fairly
apparent, although as with virtually any category, they tend to fray at the margins. See
Kennedy, supranote 11, at 1688-89 (describing certainty and restraint from arbitrariness as the
virtues and the sacrifice of precision in the achievement of underlying social objectives as the
cost of formally realizable rules).
14. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION
5-6 (2005) [hereinafter THE ANTTRuST ENTERPRISE]. During its 19th year, the Rehnquist Court
decided only 11 cases involving issues of substantive antitrust law. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,408-10 (2004) (finding that although Verizon
had agreed to provide to competitors network elements on an unbundled basis in compliance
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 but failed to do so, Verizon did not violate antitrust
laws because Verizon had not voluntarily dealt with its rivals); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 769-73 (1999) (finding that advertising restrictions imposed by a trade association
require more than a "quick look" rule of reason analysis to determine if the restrictions were
anticompetitive); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1998) (finding that
although group boycotts are illegal per se, the rule does not apply to a single buyer's decision to
buy from one supplier rather than another); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (overruling
the rule from Albrecht v. Herald Co. that resale price fixing is a per se violation of the law);
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-27 (1993) (finding
that because a reasonable prospect or "dangerous probability of recouping an investment in
below-cost pricing" is a necessary element to a claim of predatory pricing, a member of an
oligopoly must provide more than a complex chain of cause and effect to establish the
recoupment element in a claim against another member of the oligopoly); Spectrum Sports, Inc.
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456-58 (1993) (finding that although proof of unfair or predatory
conduct may establish an intent to monopolize, such conduct alone is not sufficient to establish
a probability of success); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451,462-63
(1992) (affirming reversal of summary judgment by the Court of Appeals because there was a
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substantive antitrust cases it decided, the Rehnquist Court sometimes followed
a rule-based approach, particularly with respect to exclusionary practices,
where it seemed concerned about the deleterious effects of open-ended,
unpredictable standards on incentives to compete.' 5 The Roberts Court has
shown somewhat of a greater appetite for antitrust, deciding three antitrust
cases in its first term 16 and granting certiorari in two more. 17 But the Supreme
Court simply has not decided enough antitrust cases in recent years to permit a
broad generalization about its direction. With the Supreme Court rarely
intervening, a movement away from rules and toward standards has been
carried out by the lower courts and antitrust enforcement agencies, which have
followed an impulse to manage antitrust adjudication in a more multi-factor,
fact-dependent, and ex post way than under the older rule-based model.
genuine issue as to whether Kodak unlawfully tied the sale of service of machines to the sale of
replacement parts and held monopoly power in the sale of its replacement parts); Palmer v. BRG
of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (finding that because an agreement between
competitors to allocate territories in order to minimize competition is on its face illegal, it is
irrelevant whether the parties split a market in which they both do business or merely reserve
one market for one and another market for the other); FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
493 U.S. 411,425 (1990) (finding that when attorneys in private practice who regularly acted as
court appointed defense counsel agreed to stop providing such services, it constituted an
unlawful restraint on price and output in violation of the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the
political message they intended to send); Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 569-71
(1990) (finding that when Texaco gave substantial discounts, which were unrelated to services
or Texaco's cost savings, to gasoline retailers that were also distributors for Texaco, such
discounts were illegal price discrimination because they injured retailers that were not also
distributors); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-28 (1988) (finding
that an arrangement where supplier terminated relationship with a dealer at the request of a
competing dealer was not per se illegal because the agreement did not include prices or price
levels). See generally Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Business Power, in THE REHNQUIST
COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT

(Herman Schwartz, ed. 2002) (providing a critical

analysis of the Rehnquist Court's antitrust jurisprudence and expressing relief that the Court did
not take more antitrust cases). It remains to be seen whether the Roberts Court-led by a Chief
Justice who has spent a good bit of time in private practice on antitrust matters-will take a
greater interest. For his part, Justice Alito has signaled a low degree of interest in antitrust. See
Hearing on the Nomination ofJudge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, 109th Cong.
(2006) (Statement of Sen. Mike Dewine on Antitrust Issues), availableat 2006 WL 53273.
15. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Rehnquist Court's
preference for a rule-based approach).
16. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1281 (2006) (holding that there was no
per se illegal price fixing agreement); Indep. Ink, Inc. v. I11.Tool Works, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1462,
1462 (2006) (denying cert.); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct.
860, 864 (2006) (holding that the manufacturer was not liable for price discrimination).
17. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 425 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct.
2965 (2006) (No. 1126, 2006 Term); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co., 411 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (No. 381, 2006
Term).
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A. Collusion
Any student of U.S. antitrust doctrine in the past half-century quickly
learned that restraints of trade fall into two categories-(1) those that are per se
illegal; and (2) those that require examination under the rule of reason.' 8 The
rule of reason is, for present purposes, a misnomer, since it is theoretically at
least more standard-like than rule-like.' 9 Under the classic Chicago Boardof
Trade20 formulation, conduct falling within the rule of reason must be
examined under a wide range of criteria, including the structure of the relevant
industry, the justifications for the restraint, and its effects on prices and output
levels. On the other hand, conduct falling within the per se rule is absolutely
prohibited. Antitrust doctrine curtails inquiry into the reasons for the conduct,
the market power of the firm engaging in the conduct, and the desirability of
the conduct from a consumer welfare perspective.2 '
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in UnitedStates v. Topco Associates,
Inc.22 arguably represents the high water mark ofthe absolutist nature of the per
se rule. The defendants were small regional grocers that formed a buying
cooperative to create a private label brand-Topco--in order to compete more
effectively with large national grocery chains. 23 In order to prevent free-riding
on local-market promotion of the Topco brand, the participating grocers agreed
to a system of exclusive territories. 4 When the federal government challenged
the Topco exclusivity system as a per se illegal market division agreement, the
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRuST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK §§ 5.3c-5.3f (2000) (describing the development of the Rule of Reason
and the per se rule doctrine).
19. I say "theoretically at least" because, as discussed below, the Rule of Reason often
resulted in fairly summary adjudication for the defendant. Below, I consider the possibility that

the rule of reason was once fairly rule-like in application.
20. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-41 (1918) (describing the criteria
used under the Rule of Reason).
2 1. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940) (noting that
the elimination of competitive evils is no justification for "buying programs," and it is irrelevant
that the price-fixing group did not control the market).
22. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23. Id. at 599-60 (describing the nature and purpose of the buying cooperative).
24. Id. at 601 (listing Topco's bylaws). On the free-riding concerns that motivated the
exclusivity system in Topco, see Alan J. Meese, IntrabrandRestraints and the Theory of the
Firm, 83 N.C. L. REv. 5, 70-71 (2004). But see Robert Pitofsky, Joint Venture Guidelines:

Views from One of the Drafters, Speech before ABA Antitrust Section Workshop: Joint
Ventures and Strategic Alliances: The New Federal Antitrust Competitor Collaboration
Guidelines (Nov. 11, 1999), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/jvg99 11 .htm (questioning
whether Topco exclusivity system was necessary to prevent free-riding) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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district court made a series of "dream" findings for an antitrust defendant:
Topco's members had no market power; the exclusivity system was supported
by legitimate free-riding concerns; the exclusivity system would strengthen the
Topco grocers and make them more efficient competitors with the large
national grocery chains; and enjoining operation of the Topco exclusivity
system would actually diminish competition in the grocery business because it
would make the dominant national chains even more dominant.25 As Justice
Blackmun lamented in dissent, the effect of enjoining the exclusivity
system
26
would be that "[t]he bigs... should find it easier to get bigger.,
Without denying the validity of any of the district court's findings, Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Supreme Court nonetheless reversed the district
court's opinion approving the Topco exclusivity system. His opinion dismissed
the possibility of a balancing, post-hoc approach to antitrust adjudication. The
problems with such an approach include institutional incompetence to engage
in meaningful fact-specific balancing ("The fact is that courts are of limited
utility in examining difficult economic problems"), 27 loss of ex ante
predictability for the subjects of the legal regime ("Without the per se rules,
businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular
case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act"), 28 and
general distrust of economic theory ("Should Congress ultimately determine
that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course, make
per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts free to ramble
through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible
approach"). 9
Although the law of collaborative conduct was often presented as a
dualism between the rule of reason and the per se rule,3 ° there was actually a
third category that also appeared in rule-like form: per se legality. For
example, under the venerable Colgate doctrine, 31 a manufacturer was free to
announce a suggested retail price ("MSRP") and then refuse prospectively to do
business with any retailer that deviated from the MSRP. Although it would not
25. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033, 1040, 1042 (N.D.
111. 1970), rev 'd,405 U.S. 596 (1972) (considering factors that weighed in Topco's favor).
26. Topco, 405 U.S. at 612.
27. Id. at 609.
28. Id. at609n.10.
29. Id.
30. See Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29,33-34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing
the traditional "dichotomous categorical approach" in Section 1 cases).
31. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (noting that Colgate's
behavior did not violate the Sherman Act).
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take any great stretch of legal reasoning or the English language to imagine

such conduct as an agreed-upon restraint of trade, 32 the Supreme Court
(influenced by the property rights and freedom of contract formalist ideology of
the Lochner era) 33 permitted such use of MSRPs as an absolute right. But

because setting of retail prices by agreement was (and still is to some extent)
per se illegal,34 a manufacturer who deviated ever so slightly from the simple
model of announcing an MSRP and cutting off any cheating retailer would lose
the Colgate privilege and find itself within the per se rule. 35 This doctrinal
dualism caused radical swings between the poles of per se legality and illegality
based on slight differences in the challenged conduct.36
In recent years, there has been a marked transition away from rules and
toward standards in collaborative conduct cases. This occurred in an obvious
way beginning in the 1970s as the Burger and then Rehnquist courts overruled

Warren court precedents that had condemned a variety of business agreements
as per se illegal. As common business practices such as vertical territorial
allocations, 37 maximum resale price setting, 38 expulsions of members from

32. Under traditional contract law doctrine, a unilateral contract is formed by a promisee's
performance of a requested act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981) ("Where
an offeror invites an offeree to accept by rendering performance and does not invite a
promissory acceptance, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the
invited performance or tenders a beginning of it."). If a manufacturer announces an MSRP and
a retailer acquiesces by selling the product at that price, a unilateral contract has been formed in
conventional terms. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized that an invitation to
collude followed by unspoken acquiescence meets the threshold requirement of a "contract,
combination, or conspiracy." Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 209 (1939).
33. Edward P. Krugman, Soap, Cream of Wheat andBakeries: The IntellectualOrigins
of the Colgate Doctrine, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 827, 829 (1991) (noting the Court's concern
with economic liberty).
34. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373,406 (1911) (stating
that fixing prices at which agents may sell products is a violation of the Sherman Act); c~f State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (noting that the imposition of maximum prices is not per
se illegal).
35. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,46-48 (1960) (finding that active
inducement of unwilling retailers to comply is a violation of the Sherman Act); Albrecht v.
Herald & Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (same).
36. In Albrecht, for instance, the defendant's only deviation from privileged exercise of its
Colgate rights was that it integrated forward into distribution and hired another person to
deliver newspapers on the terminated distributor's old routes. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147-48.
37. Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967)
(applying the per se standard), with Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977) (overruling Schwinn and applying the rule of reason).
38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (demonstrating the shift from per se to Rule
of Reason in maximum price setting).
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industry associations, 39 and manufacturer acquiescence in a retailer's demand to
terminate a competing retailer that was deviating from the manufacturer's
MSRP 40 went from the per se rule to the rule of reason, the domain of rules
shrunk and the domain of standards grew. Significantly, the Court declined the
Chicago School's call to move vertical restraints from per se illegality to per se
legality. In State Oil,Justice O'Connor-who is also fond of balancing tests in
constitutional law 4 -went out of her way to make clear that the Court was not
holding "that all vertical maximum price fixing is per se lawful. ' 42 Vertical
restraints would still require scrutiny, but under the multi-factored rule of
reason.
The transition from rules to standards did not take place solely due to a
juridical shift of particular business practices from one category to another.
Instead, the entire judicial rhetoric of antitrust has moved in a more nuanced,
standard-based direction over the past few decades. With few exceptions, 43 the
courts have stopped creating new categories of per se illegal conduct, even
though commercial circumstances and practices evolve over time and litigation
39. CompareRadiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,659
(1961) (applying the per se standard) with Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985) (applying a rule of reason analysis).
40. CompareKlor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959)
(applying per se standard) with Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36
(1988) (rejecting the per se standard). In Sharp, the Court denied that it was overruling Klor's,
which it characterized as a horizontal case because Broadway Hale had gotten its suppliers to
agree among themselves not to supply Klor's. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 734. However, the horizontal
aspects of the case were certainly not stressed in Klor's, and the Sharp distinction has the effect
of essentially limiting Klor's to its facts.
41. See Suzanna Sherry, The Unmakingof a Precedent,55 SuP. CT. REv. 231,266 (2003)
(noting that O'Connor prefers to maintain a fagade of adhering to precedent rather than
acknowledging its weaknesses).
42. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997); cf RichardA. Posner, The Next Step in
the Antitrust Treatment of RestrictedDistribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CI-u. L. REv. 6, 23
(1981) (arguing for per se legality for most vertical restraints).
43. Although the Supreme Court has not created a new per se illegal category in a very
long time, a lower court will occasionally stretch the bounds of the per se rule to encompass a
new practice. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding per se illegal an agreement between a branded pharmaceutical firm and a generic
pharmaceutical firm whereby the generic firm would not produce a drug allegedly infiinging the
branded firm's patent during the pendency of the infringement litigation). But see In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 386-88 (2d Cir. 2005) (evaluating such
settlements under the rule of reason); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1309 (11 th Cir. 2003) (same); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp.
2d 188, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); contra Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056,
1065 (2005) (rejecting explicitly the rule of reason). See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust
Implications of Patent Settlements, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION POLICY (Dale Collins, ed.,
forthcoming 2007).
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frequently explores new areas of commercial behavior. Since the mid-i 970s,
the Supreme Court seems to have frozen the canon of per se illegal practices,
without necessarily pushing all other behavior into rule of reason. Instead,4
arguably beginning with National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. FTC'
in 1978, the Court adopted what later became known as the "quick look"
approach. In subsequent cases like NCAA v. Board ofRegents45 and California
Dental Ass'n v. FTC,46 the Court described the quick look approach as
involving an initial court determination, based on a "rudimentary understanding
of economics, ' ,47 that the practice at issue has obvious anticompetitive effects,
which puts the defendant to the burden of immediately putting forth a
48
procompetitive justification for the practice.
The quick look approach could be nothing more than an initial triaging
tool to decide whether the particular practice falls into the per se rule or the rule
of reason, but its effects on antitrust doctrine have been more transformative.
Although the Supreme Court has only hinted in this direction,49 the Federal
Trade Commission and some federal appellate courts have explicitly read the
Quick Look cases, in combination with the "characterization" cases discussed
in the next section, to have broken down the entire dualistic structure of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. In its recent Polygram decision, the D.C. Circuit
reported: "The Supreme Court's approach to evaluating a § I claim has gone
through a transition over the last twenty-five years, from a dichotomous
' 50
categorical approach to a more nuanced and case-specific inquiry."
Polygram was an appeal of a decision by the Federal Trade Commission
finding illegal an agreement between Polygram Records and Warner Music
44. Nat'l Soc'y ofProf l Eng'rs v. FTC, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In PolygramHolding,Inc.
v. FTC,416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit described ProfessionalEngineersas

the last of the dualist cases. But see infranote 106-08 and accompanying text (describing later
cases in which the Supreme Court mechanically applied the per se rule).
45. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
46.

Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).

47.
48.

Id. at 770.
On the Quick Look approach, see Max R. Shulman, The Quick Look Rule of Reason:
Retreatfrom Binary AntitrustAnalysis, 2 SEDONACONF. J.89 (2001), Alan J. Meese, Farewell
to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule ofReason, 68 ANTrrRUST L.J.
461 (2000), Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but not the Full
Monty, 67 ArTrRUST L.J. 495 (2000), James A. Keyte, What Is It and How IsIt Being Applied:
The "Quick Look" Rule of Reason, ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 21, and Kathleen E.
McDermott, A Quick Look at the "Quick Look " ANTITRUST, Spring 1991, at 32.
49. See Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 779 ("The truth is that our categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason'

tend to make them appear.").
50. Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 33-34 (2005).

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007)
with respect to the marketing of recordings of live concerts by the famed "Three
Tenors" (Josd Carreras, Placido Domingo, and Luciano Pavarotti). Polygram
had distribution rights to the original 1990 Three Tenors recording and Warner
had rights to the second (1994) Three Tenors recording." In 1998, the Three
Tenors made a third recording and Warner and Polygram agreed to distribute it
jointly. Ostensibly to avoid free-riding on their joint promotional activities, the
distributors agreed that they would each forego promoting the earlier two
albums for a six-week period during which the 1998 album was going to be
heavily promoted.52
The Federal Trade Commission's staff challenged the "moratorium"
agreement as anticompetitive, 53 and the administrative law judge, the
Commission itself, and the D.C. Circuit all agreed. Following the rule-based
system, the analysis could have been quite short. As the ALJ found, (and the
Commission, at least, agreed), the agreement not to discount the separate
products marketed by the joint venturers outside the joint venture was "simply a
form of price fixing. 5 4 In conventional terms, that would have meant per se
condemnation, without considering the reasons for the agreement: whether
defendants had market power, whether there were anticompetitive effects, and
other rule of reason factors. Yet both the Commission and the D.C. Circuit
went out of their way to stress that they were not evaluating the restraint in any
fixed category because fixed categories are no longer in vogue. As the D.C.
Circuit explained, it would be a mistake to think of the Quick Look approach as
51. Id. at31.
52. Id. at 32.
53. Although the FTC challenged the practice under § 5 of the FTC Act and not § 1 of the
Sherman Act, the agency and the courts treated the analysis under both statutes as identical. See
id. at 32 (observing that that the FTC was correct in concluding "that the analysis under § 5 of
the FTC Act is the same in this case as it would be under § I of the Sherman Act). This point is
significant for present purposes because the Supreme Court has ruled that the FTC may have
more prophylactic flexibility under the FTC Act than either the Department of Justice or a
private litigant would have under the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,
322 (1966) (rejecting the argument that the government must prove a violation of the Sherman
Act or of the Clayton Act in order to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency when acting
pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344
U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953) ("[Tlhe Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, to stop in their incipiency acts and practices
which, when full blown, would violate those Acts."). However, the fact that both the FTC and
the D.C. Circuit equated the analysis under the two statutes and relied interchangeably on
Supreme Court cases involving the FTC and private litigants indicates that the approach to
collaborative conduct outlined in Polygram and similar FTC decisions is not limited to public
enforcement.
54. In re Polygram Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 9298, 2003 WL 21770765, at * 16 (FTC
July 24, 2003).
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merely a new antitrust category-as though "the Court has moved from a
dichotomy to a trichotomy" 55-when in fact the question
is always "whether...
56
the challenged restraint enhances competition.
To put it that way is to take the law of collaborative restraints out of rules
and place it squarely into a flexible, post-hoc framework. Although a
reticulated burden-shifting framework remains in place,57 it is procedural and
flexible rather than substantive and rigid. Rather than specifying ex ante rules
of conduct, it allocates burdens of proof and persuasion within the litigation:
Step One: The judge or agency considers whether the restraint obviously harms
consumers; Step Two: If so, the judge or agency concludes that the practice
does presumptively harm consumers, the defendant must come forward with a
plausible and legally cognizable efficiency justification; Step Three: If the
defendant does, the burden shifts back to the agency to address the justification,
in one of two ways; and so forth. 58 This approach captures the values of a
standard (flexibility, ex post policy making, fact specificity, object dependence)
and eschews the values of a rule (predictability, ex ante policy making, category
generality, subject dependence).
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will ultimately accept
that its precedents signaled an end to doctrinal dichotomy, trichotomy, or any
other discrete categorization and an opening to the incremental continualism
adopted by the Polygram court. In its most recent Section I decision, the Court
continued to speak as though the traditional categories still applied. 59 However,
signs abound that the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from
both of its rule-bound poles-per se legality and per se illegality-toward a
flexible center. Not only are practices like the no-discounting agreement in
Polygram, that once would have been condemned as per se illegal, now
adjudged under a more nuanced standard, but practices that might have been
rubber-stamped as acceptable under older rule of reason jurisprudence are
receiving a more thorough investigation under a reinvigorated rule of reason.

55.
56.
57.

Polygram Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1999)).
The FTC traces this approach back to its decision in In re Massachusetts Bd.of

Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
58. See Polygram, 416 F.3d at 35-36 (summarizing the analysis employed by the
Commission in considering Polygram's conduct).
59. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), the Court held that ajoint venture
that unified its marketing and production functions but continued to sell separately through its
joint venturers and set a uniform price for the individual joint venturer's sales had not
committed a per se illegal price-fix.
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The outset of this section said that the rule of reason was, "theoretically at
least," a more fact-intensive, multi-factor approach than the per se rule. The
caveat was necessary because many scholars believe that categorization of a
practice into the rule of reason once meant virtual per se legality. During the
earlier years of the Chicago revolution, Richard Posner offered that "the content
of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a
euphemism for nonliability," 60 and during its later years Frank Easterbrook
offered that adjudication under the rule of reason "as a practical matter meant
that [the challenged practices] were declared lawful per se., 61 This may have
been a bit of an overstatement, since, focusing even on just the Supreme Court
precedents, defendants have lost some significant rule of reason cases, 62 Still,
the assessment that rule of reason often came close to a rule of per se legality
was not far off the mark, especially in cases involving vertical restraints.63
60. Richard A. Posner, The Rule ofReason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CuI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977). More recent assessments along the
same lines are plentiful. See Albert A. Foer, The Political-EconomicNature ofAntitrust, 27 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 331, 337-3 8 (1983) ("With only slight exaggeration, there is really only one thing
one needs to know about the rule of reason: when the rule is applied, the defendant virtually
always wins."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the PerSe and Rule ofReason Approaches
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 685 (1991) ("The rule of reason and per se
approaches have been so divergent that a court's choice of one analysis over the other will
usually determine the outcome of an antitrust case. Traditionally, the rule of reason has meant a
decision for the defendant and the per se rule a victory for the plaintiff."); Mark E. Roszkowski,
State Oil Company v. Khan and the Rule ofReason: The End oflntrabrandCompetition? 66
ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 638 (1998) ("There is no justifiable reason for the rule of reason to be the
'defendant always wins' non-standard sanctioned by the Chicago School."); Joe Sims,
Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTrTRuST L.J. 433, 435 (1989); ("If it
was per se illegal the plaintiffs won; if it was rule of reason the defendants won; and all you had
to do was put it in the right box. For those who like bright-line rules, this was perfect.");
Deborah A. Widiss, Uneasy Labeling, 107 YALE L.J. 1529, 1529 (1998) ("In theory, rule-ofreason analysis requires a careful examination of the competitive impact of a specific agreement;
in practice, however, the challenged agreement is rarely struck down."); Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX
Corp., 93 F.3d 1055, 1059 (2d. Cir. 1996), vacated, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S.
128 (1998) ("[The] initial categorization is often outcome-determinative.").
61. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating AntitrustDecisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305,
305 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992);
Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1945) (holding that Associated Press by-laws
unlawfully restricted admission into the membership for the publishers' association in violation
of the Sherman Act); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 411-13
(1912) (finding that defendants' unification of substantially every railway terminal serving the
traffic of St. Louis resulted in a combination which constituted a restraint of trade within the
meaning and purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
63. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of
Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1992) (reporting that defendants have won over 90% of rule
of reason decisions in vertical nonprice cases since Sylvania).
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In recent years, even as the per se rule has moved toward a more flexible
balancing approach, the rule of reason seems to have become reinvigorated.
Important cases like UnitedStates v. Visa, Inc.,64 have found business practices
to be in violation of the rule of reason, resulting in billions of dollars of
payments to consumers and sometimes radical restructuring of industry
practices. Some lesser known decisions have also held that particular business
practices failed the rule of reason. 65 At the same time, the venerable Colgate
rule--categorically privileging firms to announce in advance the criteria they
will use to choose upstream or downstream business partners-appears to be
gradually dissolving into a more flexible middle ground between per se legality
and per se illegality. Judicial decisions have found ways to narrow the Colgate
"right" without casting the conduct to the opposite pole of per se illegality.6 6
In sum, the law of collaborative restraints of trade is collapsing from both
of its poles-per se legality and per se illegality-into a broad middle ground

where nothing is prejudged and everything is negotiable through litigation.
B. Exclusion
It is more difficult to tell a strong "before and after" rules versus standards
story with respect to exclusionary practices than it is to tell that same story with

64. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003). In the settlement of
the private lawsuits following the Justice Department action, Visa settled for $2 billion and
Mastercard for $1 billion. Jennifer Bayot, Lawyers Seek $609 Million FeeforNegotiatingDeal
for Retailers with Visa and Mastercard,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at C4.
65. See, e.g., Telecor Commc'n, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (10th
Cir. 2002) (finding that defendant telephone company monopolized the payphone market in
Oklahoma by attempting to "lock up" possible payphone locations through long-term contracts
with the location owners); Toys 'R' Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding
that petitioner had created a horizontal agreement among toy manufacturers, rather than merely
a series of separate, similar vertical agreements between petitioner and various toy
manufacturers); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that a rule
promulgated by the defendant, NCAA, which limited the annual compensation of certain
coaches violated the Sherman Antitrust Act); Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc.,
82 F.3d 1533, 1556 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant's department store violated the
state Antitrust Act by copying plaintiffs copyrighted fabric designs).
66. See, e.g., Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1013
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that manufacturer's refusal to do business with service provider was
"perse legal, because a 'manufacturer has a right to select its customers and refuse to sell its
goods to anyone, for reasons sufficient to itself,"' but then holding that the service provider "is
required to establish the unreasonableness of the alleged trade restraint"); Toys 'R' Us, 221 F.3d
at 939-40 (holding that Toys 'R' Us did not have a Colgate right to encourage its suppliers not
to sell certain toys to "club" retailers and affirming the evaluation of such restraints under the
Rule of Reason).
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respect to the law of voluntary restraints. Monopolization law has always been
more flexible and fact-sensitive. This is partly because Section 1 of the
Sherman Act gives a clear target for adjudication-a "contract, combination, or
conspiracy" that, juridically, must be the subject of the court's inquiry. Section
2, by contrast, contains no clear target because all of a firm's amorphous
conduct may be relevant to answering the question whether it unlawfully
monopolized. A strenuous debate is presently stirring in antitrust circles about
how to conceptualize the monopolization offense.67 After over a century of
Sherman Act development, we still are not clear on the organizing principles of
exclusionary practices law.
Yet it is not difficult to locate a variety of actual or potential rules, both
imposing liability and immunizing against it, in the arena of exclusionary
68
practices. Examples include: (1) above-cost prices are never predatory;
(2) pricing below cost is presumed predatory; 69 (3) patents are presumed to
confer market power, and requiring customers to purchase a separate item if
they want to purchase the patented item amounts to per se illegal tying; 70 (4) no
firm with a market share of less than 50% is a monopolist; 7 1 (5) even a
67. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 56
EMORY L.J. 423, 485-86 (2006) (arguing that the best approach to mixed bundling cases is to
announce clearly demarcated prohibitions and safe harbors to maximize consumer and social
welfare without attempting to formulate a generalizable theory of exclusionary conduct); Einer
Elhauge, DefiningBetterMonopolizationStandards,56 STAN. L. REV. 253,253-54,272 (2003)
(rejecting the sacrifice standard and proposing an efficiency standard which would find a
furtherance of monopolistic power only if exclusionary conduct impairs the efficiency of a rival
but not if it only improves the actor's own efficiency); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the
ShermanAct, 72 U. Cm. L. REv. 147, 149-64 (2005) (summarizing the utility of each proposed
standard); Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Searchfor Standards,93
GEO. L.J. 1623, 1626-44 (2005) (summarizing the debate over proposed standards).
68. See Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,230 (1993)
(holding that a predatory pricing plaintiff must prove that defendant priced below an appropriate
measure of cost).
69. See Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T, 651 F.2d 76, 99 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that prices below
reasonably anticipated marginal cost will be presumed predatory); Phillip Areeda & Donald F.
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697, 716-18 (1975) (concluding that prices below marginal cost can be equated
with "below cost" predation).
70. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(reviewing Supreme Court precedent establishes that patent tying is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act).
71. CompareUnited States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1945)
(opining that "it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent [market share] would be enough"
to constitute a monopoly), and Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2
(5th Cir. 1969) (observing that a 50% market share is a "prerequisite for a finding of
monopoly"), with Broadway Delivery Corp. v. UPS, 651 F.2d 122, 127-29 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a 50% market share is not a prerequisite for being a monopolist).
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2
dominant firm has no obligation to cooperate with its competitor;

(6) exclusive dealing is per se legal if more than 80% of the market remains
open to competitors; 73 (7) exclusive dealing cannot be illegal if the nondominant party is free to terminate the contract on short notice; 74 (8) a firm does

not have market power in an after market if it lacks market power in the
primary market;75 (9) bundled discounts are not unlawful unless an equally
efficient competitor making only one product covered by the discount would
have to price below its cost in order to compete; 76 and (10) a firm can never be
liable for monopolization based on the mere fact that it has designed its
products in a way that harms competitors.7 7
For its part, the Supreme Court has not yet given a strong indication of any
general predilection for rules or standards with respect to exclusionary
practices. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion made a nod toward standards:
"Legal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to

resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the 'particular facts
disclosed by the record."' 7 8 As discussed below, a number of lower court
judges have taken this admonition as a general preference for flexible post-hoc
72. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,40910 (2004) (rejecting an antitrust claim based on an incumbent LEC's insufficient assistance in
the provision of service to its rivals); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that the ski resort could be held liable for refusing to continue joint ski
pass arrangement with its competitor).
73. See 1 ABA SECTION of ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 222 (5th ed.
2002) (surveying cases and reporting that there thus exists a "virtual safe harbor for market
foreclosure of 20 percent or less").
74. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 387, 453 (D. Del. 2003),
rev'd 399 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that because defendant had not created a market
with supra competitive pricing and dealers were free to leave the network at any time, the
Government failed to prove that defendant's actions were an unreasonable restraint on
competition).
75. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470-71 (1992)
(rejecting Kodak's request for a rule that lack of power in the primary market necessarily
precludes power in the after markets).
76. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455,469 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that bundled discounts are not unlawful unless "(a) the monopolist has priced
below its average variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the
competitive product as the defendant, but that the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable for
the plaintiff to continue to produce.").
77. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for per se immunity from
antitrust liability for product design of patented goods).
78. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67.
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determinations in exclusionary conduct cases. 7 9 But it is not clear that a
consistent majority of the Supreme Court's justices in the past two decades
would prefer to shun rules in exclusionary conduct cases. In two of its most
recent decisions, the Court has seemingly applied rules corresponding to
examples (1) and (5) above.80 On the other hand, it rejected rules (3) and (8) in
favor of a more fact-specific approach.8 ' In one of the Court's most recent
exclusionary practices decision, involving discriminatory manufacturer rebates
to dealers selling to different customers, the Court formulated its holding in a
fairly rule-like way, although it left open the possibility that the rule might not
apply in extraordinary cases.82 But the Court has heard so few exclusionary
conduct cases in the last few years that it is difficult to extrapolate a general
direction.
On the other hand, there is a definite trend in the lower courts in favor of
standards over rules. In many of the recent significant exclusionary practices
cases, the lower courts have rejected categorical rules that would either have
created or immunized against liability for exclusionary practices, even though
there was often support for such rules in case law precedent or in the academic
literature. In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,83 the D.C. Circuit not only
rejected the district court's per se approach to the tying of Windows and
Internet Explorer and remanded for consideration under a full rule of reason
approach but also rejected Microsoft's argument that its product design
79. See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (describing the trend in lower courts as
rejecting rules and moving toward open-ended, fact-specific adjudication of exclusionary
practice cases).
80. See supra notes 68 & 72 and accompanying text (noting cases that stand for these
principles).
81. See supra notes 70 & 75 and accompanying text (noting cases that espouse these
principles).
82. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 860, 866
(2006) (holding that manufacturer ordinarily may not be held liable for secondary-line price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a showing that the
manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail
customer).
83. See U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the
court needed additional information before deciding whether the violations would be per se
violations, and accordingly "vacat[ing] the District Court's finding ofper se tying liability under
Sherman Act § 1" and "remand[ing] the case for evaluation of Microsoft's tying arrangements
under the rule of reason"). Microsoft deviates from earlier Supreme Court decisions that had
seemed to impose a rule of per se illegality where the defendant has market power in the tying
market. See, e.g., Fortner Enter., Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969) ("Our
tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic power over the tying product can
be sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even though the power
only exists with respect to some of the buyers in the market").
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decisions were "per se lawful." In United States v.Dentsply International,
Inc.,84 the Third Circuit rejected defendant's argument that an exclusive dealing

arrangement could not be exclusionary if the customer could terminate it at
will. In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 85 the Ninth Circuit rejected
plaintiffs argument that an exclusive dealing contract of approximately six
years of duration was "inherently unreasonable. 8 6 In LePage 's, Inc. v. 3M,87
the Third Circuit held that bundled discounts are not subject to bright line
cost/revenue comparison tests applicable in predatory pricing cases, but must
be evaluated based on whether they have exclusionary effects.88 In Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,89 the Sixth Circuit held that even in
single product predation cases, a dominant firm does not have an absolute
defense if it priced above its cost. 90 In Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,91 the
Sixth Circuit held that the facts of output expansion, new product introduction,
and plaintiffs market share increase during the period of the alleged
monopolization did not categorically negate the possibility that the defendant
was monopolizing. 92 Framing the governing law as a rule would have been
possible in all of these cases, but the courts declined in preference for a
standard-based approach.
84. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
that regardless of the "at-will" arrangement, "the economic elements involved-the large share
of the market held by Dentsply and its conduct excluding competing manufacturersrealistically make the arrangements here as effective as those in written contracts). The
possibility of a "rule" in this area is shown by cases like Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser
Industries,Inc., where the Seventh Circuit held that exclusive dealing contracts "terminable in
less than a year are presumptively lawful." Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749
F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984).
85. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com Inc., 127 Fed. Appx. 346 (9th Cir. 2005).
86. See id. at 348 ("Tickets.com has not shown that the contract length is inherently
unreasonable or that competitive entry is unduly difficult.")
87. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
88. Id. at 154-57 ("'[T]he great majority of bundled rebate programs yield aggregate
prices above cost. Rather than analogizing them to predatory pricing, they are best compared
with tying, whose foreclosure effects are similar."' (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 794, at 83 (Supp. 2002))).
89. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).
90. See id.at 951-52 ("[W]e adopted the Inglis rule that acknowledges that 'in certain
situations, a firm selling above average variable cost could be guilty of predation."' (quoting
Williams Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. IT' Cont'l Baking Co., Inc., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1981))).
91. Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788-91 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding that "higher prices and reduced consumer choice" injured competition).
92. See id. at 788-91 (noting that while output increased, the defendant nonetheless
caused "higher prices and reduced consumer choice" and also stating that while the plaintiff's
sales increased, "the growth ...slowed").
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In these and a number of other recent exclusionary practices decisions,
federal appellate courts have signaled that simple rules are insufficient to
address the diverse and complex business practices governed by the antitrust
laws addressed to exclusionary practices. Rhetorical slogans expressing the
impossibility of rule-based monopolization law are being repeated in the
leading cases, linking together disparate exclusionary practices cases to form a
common standard-oriented jurisprudence. Courts have taken Kodak's
admonition against "legal presumptions based on formalistic distinctions" 93 as a
mandate for adjudicatory flexibility and post hoc decision making.94 The D.C.
Circuit's proclamation that "'[a]nticompetitive conduct' can come in too many
different forms, and is too dependent upon context, for any court or
commentator ever to have enumerated all the varieties ' 95 is gaining
popularity-and an aura of inevitability-through repetition.9 6 The implication
is that since it is impossible to catalogue anticompetitive practices ex ante, the
liability determinants governing exclusionary practices can never be decided
until a particular practice is examined in context of litigation. Another popular
maxim, derived from the Supreme Court's ContinentalOre decision, cautions
courts to give plaintiffs "the full benefit of their proof without tightly
compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the slate clean
after scrutiny of each."9 7 Courts sometimes employ the ContinentalOre maxim
to justify rejecting rule-based holdings in exclusionary practices cases,
reasoning that no single rule can exonerate the defendant since the legality of

93. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992).
94. See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The
Supreme Court on more than one occasion has emphasized that economic realities rather than a
formalistic approach must govern review of antitrust activity."); Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC
Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 522 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ("[O]nly a thorough analysis of
each fact situation will reveal whether the monopolist's conduct is unreasonably anticompetitive and thus unlawful."); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Appleton Papers, Inc., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1144 (D. Minn. 1999) ("When ascertaining the characteristics of an exclusive
dealing arrangement, courts look to the 'practical effect' of the agreement, not merely to its
form."); USAirways Group, Inc. v. British Airways PLC, 989 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) ("Invocation of the per se rule is rarely appropriate and should be used sparingly.").
95. Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
96. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting CaribbeanBroadcastSystem, Ltd. for the proposition that "'Anticompetitive conduct'
can come in too many different forms, and is too dependent upon context, for any court or
commentator ever to have enumerated all the varieties" (quoting CaribbeanBroadcast, 148
F.3d at 1087))); LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (same);
Conwood, 290 F.3d at 784 (same); Z-Tel Commc'ns, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 522 (same).
97. Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
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each practice depends upon its interaction with other practices. 98 This approach
lessens the possibility of a rule-bound approach to exclusionary practices cases
by increasing the number of variables necessary to determine liability.
To be sure, courts still adjudicate some exclusionary practices cases based
on rules. A prominent recent example includes the Department of Justice's
losing predatory pricing lawsuit against American Airlines that was dismissed
on summary judgment because the government could not demonstrate that
American priced below its cost.99 But the trend is clearly in the opposite
direction. As with collaborative practices, the lower courts, largely unchecked
by the Supreme Court, have been moving exclusionary practices cases into
open-ended, fact-specific adjudication.
III. The Possibilityof (Real) Rules
Before proceeding much further, it is worth pausing to consider the
possibility that a world of antitrust rules would be illusory because, in practice,
rules always fade into standards. Take H.L.A. Hart's observation that
"[n]atural languages like English are... irreducibly open-textured" when
specifying "general classifying terms,' ' 0 0 or Wittgenstein's point that the
0
problem with rules is that they do not tell you when they should be applied.' '
98. See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364 (3d
Cir. 1992) ("That evidence [of concerted action] should be analyzed as a whole, rather than
compartmentalized, to determine whether it supports an inference of concerted action.");
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 700 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("In
light of this directive [from Continental Ore], therefore, defendants' behavior will be evaluated,
and all inferences will be drawn, in light of the allegations as a whole."); Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc.,
331 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (stating that while a single claim by the plaintiff might not be sufficient
to prove monopolization, the "Supreme Court instructed that courts should not tightly
compartmentalize the varied factual components" and accordingly finding that the plaintiff's
claims in the aggregate state a claim); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, &
ROGER D. BLAIR, II, ANTITRUST LAW, § 310c7 (1996) ("In a monopolization case conduct must
always be analyzed 'as a whole.' A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant position is likely
to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each one viewed in isolation might be
viewed as de minimis or an error in judgment, but the pattern gives increased plausibility to the
claim.").
99. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1120 (10th Cir. 2003) (agreeing
with "the district court's conclusion that the government has not succeeded in establishing the
first element of Brooke Group, pricing below an appropriate measure of cost").
100. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (2d ed. 1994).
101. See LUDWIG WITTENGENSTEN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 143-252 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 1953) (using examples to exhibit that rule application depends on training and
patterns, resulting in various applications or individuals who arrive at the same result through
different mechanisms); see also Scott Hershovitz, Wittgenstein on Rules: The Phantom
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Because language is irreducibly open-textured and indeterminate and because
rules lack internal mechanisms to specify when they should be applied, even
when the law is formally framed as a rule, it requires penumbral rules, canons
of interpretation, and other secondary decisional criteria which end up
swallowing the apparent simplicity of the rule. 10 2 Specifying the governing law
as a simple, bright-line rule may merely conceal the fact that important
balancing of social interests, weighing of probabilities, and choosing between
competing ends and means lurk in the shadow of the rule. Declaring a legal
rule thus appears misleading or even dishonest because it hides the social
preferences that animate the decision-maker's conclusion.
Under one interpretation, antitrust law provides the perfect illustration for
Hart and Wittgenstein's point. In this view, there never have been such things
as case-determinative antitrust rules-only standards clad in rule-bound
rhetoric. The current march toward standards, then, is not so much a change in
liability determinants as a dissipation of the mystery surrounding antitrust's
concealed methodology. In a moment, I will dispute this possibility and argue
that the specification of antitrust law as rule or standard has very important
practical consequences. But first, it is worth acknowledging the extent to
which Hart and Wittgenstein's observation rings true in antitrust.
A case in point is antitrust law's long-standing per se prohibition against
"price fixing." As any antitrust practitioner will recognize, price fixing appears
in quotation marks because application of the per se rule depends not on the
fact that competitors have literally fixed prices but that the challenged conduct
falls within the antitrust category known as "price fixing." The judicial
decision often thought to have established the per se rule against price-fixing
did not involve price fixing either literally or figuratively but rather a
gentleman's agreement by dominant oil producers to buy up distressed oil from
small refineries and thereby stabilize the wholesale market. 103 The defendants
Menace, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 619,635 (2002) ("At the most fundamental level, we apply
rules without justification, without reason, based on how we find it natural to go on given our
training.").
102. See HART, supra note 100, at 128 (arguing that rules are not "always settled in
advance" and instead offer a "fresh choice between open alternatives" because people labor
under the twin handicaps of "relative ignorance of fact" and "relative indeterminacy of aim");
see also Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 585, 599 (1994) (arguing that rules almost always become "impossibly
cumbersome and complex").
103. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 177-200 (1940)
(noting that the "alleged conspiracy is not to be found in any formal contract or agreement" but
was based on a series of meetings during which the participants intended to improve the retail
oil market).
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never came close to agreeing on price. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held
that any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce" amounts to "price fixing" in the relevant legal sense,
whether or not the defendants have actually done the act that a lay person might
suppose "price fixing" to be-fixing a price. 104
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has described an act of apparent
price fixing by competitors-an agreement on prices for blanket licensing of
musical repertoires-as something other than "price fixing" and hence subject
to the rule of reason. 0 5 In BMI v. CBS, the Supreme Court rejected textual
"literalism" and held that application of the per se rule against price fixing is
not as "simplistic" as "determining whether two or more potential competitors
have literally 'fixed' a 'price.'" 06 Rather, "[a] s generally used in the antitrust
field, 'price fixing' is a shorthand way of describing certain categories 0of7
business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable."'
Application of the per se rule turns not on whether the conduct amounts
literally to price fixing but on whether the "particular practice is one of those
types or that it is 'plainly anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming
virtue."" 8 This flexibility in the per se rule invites endless pages of briefing
on whether the conduct at issue should be properly characterized as "price
fixing" because it unjustifiably tampers with the market mechanism for
determining prices or as something else because it can be justified by
efficiencies, a standard-favoring way of doing law.'0 9 Hence, Hart explains that
104.

Id. at 223.

105.

See BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (finding that the agreements should not

"automatically be declared illegal" and instead "should be subjected to a more discriminating
examination under the rule of reason"). Herbert Hovenkamp argues that BMldid not involve a
horizontal price fix since the artists who granted BMI and ASCAP licensing rights did not agree
with each other on anything. HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 14, at 287
(noting that the case involved thousands of "vertical agreements between licensors and a
licensee who combined them and relicensed them as a single blanket license," and arguing that
this normally "does not establish horizontal price-fixing"). Nonetheless, the Court treated the
ASCAP and BMI arrangements as conduct that literally meets the definition of"price fixing" in
a vernacular sense but is not price fixing in the antitrust sense.
106.

BMI, 441 U.S. at 8-9.

107. Id. at 9. Similarly, in its recent decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, the Court
explained that conduct that is "price fixing in a literal sense, [is not necessarily] price fixing in
the antitrust sense." Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276, 1278 (2006).
108. BM/, 441 U.S. at 9.
109. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization,Antitrust Injury, and EvidentiarySufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221, 1257-62

(1989) (arguing that in recent cases the Supreme Court has found "literal price fixing" activities
outside the per se rule, based on its inquiry "whether the restraint was ancillary to some
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rules inevitably dissolve into standards and Wittgentsein explains that rules do
not tell us when to apply them.
But although rules may not be as neatly confined as they sometimes
appear to be, it would be wrong to suppose that the specification of antitrust
law as either rule or standard has no practical consequences. Even if seasoned
lawyers can sometimes manipulate seemingly iron-clad rules to their clients'
advantage, the expression of law as rule or standard affects the attitude that
judges bring to their adjudicatory roles. The choice between rules and
standards has important legal-cultural implications in antitrust adjudication.
First, when judicial decisions about certain forms of conduct take on a
rule-bound rhetorical form, it is not always possible to recharacterize the
conduct to avoid application of the rule. For example, given the strong
efficiencies of the challenged conduct, one might have recharacterized Topco as
involving a vertical rather than horizontal restraint; thereby avoiding
application of the per se rule.1 10 However, it was sufficiently obvious that the
exclusivity system was a horizontal territorial allocation agreement that even its
uncontested efficiencies were insufficient to save the arrangement. Even in
decisions since the Supreme Court's "recharacterization" cases such as BM!
and NCAA, 111 conduct that paradigmatically fit the per se archetypes has not
escaped per se condemnation. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the
Court condemned as per se unlawful what amounted to a strike by criminal
defense lawyers.1 12 In Palmer,the court summarily reversed a court of appeals
productive purpose guided by the relevant models"); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the
Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 685, 693
(1991) ("Emphasizing the natural efficiency of markets and the dangers of over-regulation,
many influential economists and academics have convinced the courts that they should not
prohibit competitive conduct without first considering all of its qualifying circumstances.").
110. Defendants unsuccessfully attempted this in UnitedStates v. Sealy, Inc., but the Court
characterized the licensor-licensee relationship as horizontal because the licensees owned
substantially all of the licensor's stock. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 (1967);
see also Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422,426-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that
competitors are not allowed to turn an otherwise horizontal agreement into a vertical one by
setting up a licensing corporation to impose market allocation agreements).
111. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (finding that
"[w]hat the NCAA and its member institutions market ...is competition itself' and that this
"would be completely ineffective if there were no rules the competitors agreed to create and
define the competition to be marketed").
112. See FTC v. Sup. Ct. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 428-32 (1990) (finding the
attorneys' actions a "plain violation of the antitrust laws" and refusing to grant an exception to
the application of the per se rule). Confusingly, the Court primarily analyzed the lawyers' strike
as a horizontal boycott, even though the case did not fit the per se boycott category articulated in
recent cases. See FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (declining to apply a
per se rule in this case, while noting that the Court has previously applied a per se rule to
boycotts and that "the per se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms with
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decision that a market division agreement between competing bar review
courses should be analyzed under the rule of reason. So while the
indeterminacy of language may render a rule-based approach porous in
borderline cases, it does not preclude fairly mechanical application of rules in
paradigmatic cases.
The specification of a liability determinant as either a rule or a standard
may also critically affect the choice of who the ultimate legal decision-maker
will be: jury, trial judge, or appellate court. In U.S. legal culture, deference by
players higher in the judicial hierarchy to players lower in the hierarchy
depends in part on how the governing liability norm is framed. Trial judges are
more likely to enter case-dispositive rulings on motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment, a directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
if the governing law is framed as a rule than if it is a standard. Rule-oriented
liability determinants allow the court to isolate a small number of dispositive
facts in the record and hinge a dispositive order on the incontestability of those
facts (or the absence of a proof on a critical fact): i.e., the defendant did not
price below average variable cost; the contract was terminable at will with ten
days' notice; the defendant's market share was 30% indicating a lack of market
power; the manufacturer and wholesaler agreed on a minimum resale price.
Trial judges may be more reluctant to enter case-dispositive rulings where
the governing law is framed as a standard. Since liability or exculpation turns
on multiple facts, which often must be weighed and balanced against one
another, standard-based liability criteria are often said to create "issues of fact"
that cannot be summarily decided on the sufficiency of the complaint or the
undisputed facts in the record.'" 3 If the trial judge does enter a dispositive order
(usually, an order granting summary judgment for the defendant) after applying
a liability standard, the appellate court should in principle review the matter de
novo. In practice, however, appellate judges often quietly defer to trial court
judgments based on multiple criteria rather than reinvestigate a complex and
burdensome record. 1 4 When liability determinants are framed as standards,
market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business
with a competitor-a situation obviously not present here"); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) ("[Clases to which this Court has
applied the per se approach have generally involved joint efforts by a firm or firms to
disadvantage competitors ....).
113. For instance, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a restraint of trade is said to
be a question of fact. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[R]easonableness is a question of fact .. ");Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v. Winchester
Tobacco Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287, 287 (6th Cir. 1965) ("Whether a restraint is
unreasonable or whether there is any restraint is a question of fact.").
114. In factually dense rule of reason cases, it is not unusual for the Circuit Court of
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trial judges often will take this as a signal that they should be sparing in
entering dispositive orders, but when they do enter dispositive orders after
canvassing a complex record, they will often receive deference in the court of
appeals. If the appellate court does reverse, this usually means that ultimate
decision-making is allocated to the jury. Rarely will the court of appeals
reinvestigate the entire record under a standard-based decisional criterion and
reverse the decision of the jury.' 1 5
So the specification of antitrust law as a rule or a standard does have
practical importance in allocating decision-making. In general, the more that a
body of law expresses itself in rules as opposed to standards, the more
frequently that appellate courts will be the ultimate decision makers. The more
that a body of law expresses itself in standards as opposed to rules, the more
frequently both trial judges and reviewing courts will insist that the matter must
be committed to the discretion of the jury in a jury trial, the district court in a
bench trial, or the agency or administrative law judge in an administrative
proceeding. 116 Or, if the trial court does enter a dispositive ruling under multiAppeals to say something along the following lines, often in an unpublished opinion: "After
carefully considering each of these issues in light of the voluminous summary judgment record
before the district court, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough
Memorandum Opinion." Schueller v. Norman, 46 F.3d 1136, 1136 (8th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished disposition). Of course, sometimes cases involving conduct subject to the per se
rule also present factually dense summary judgment records and also invite appellate deference
to the district court's summary judgment ruling. See, e.g., Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 Fed.
Appx. 680, 682 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting the "voluminous appellate record" and finding "no error
in the district court's decision to grant summary judgment"). However, questions of antitrust
policy in per se cases (as opposed to questions of commission-did the defendants agree or not,
for example) are usually treated as crystallized questions of law inviting truly de novo appellate
review. See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir. 2004)
(holding that district court's determination that agreement was per se illegal would be reviewed
de novo and citing the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise for the proposition that although a court's
determination that the per se rule applies "might involve many fact questions, the selection of a
mode [of analysis] is entirely a question of law" (citing PHnLLiP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1909b (1998))).

115. One of the rare cases where this occurred was Brooke Group, where the Supreme
Court undertook sufficiency of the evidence review and reversed the jury's primary line price
discrimination liability verdict. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 230 (1993). Although primary line price discrimination is subject to a below-cost
rule, the Supreme Court did not decide the case based on that rule but on the implausibility of
the claim that Brown & Williamson could have recouped its costs of predation, a decidedly
more standard-like question. Id. at 224.
116. Technically, factual findings are never committed to the discretion of administrative
law judges. The FTC may review factual findings of its ALJs de novo and courts of appeals
review factual findings of the FTC under the usually deferential substantial evidence standard.
See Schering Plough Corp., Docket No. 9297, slip op. at 8 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003) (noting that
the "Commission has undertaken a de novo review of the record"); 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2005)
("The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be
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factored decisional criteria, the appellate court will often defer to the dispositive
rulings of the district court rather than reinvestigate the record. Hence, the
practical effect of rules is to push ultimate decision-making up the legal
hierarchy, and the effect of standards is to push ultimate decision-making down

the legal hierarchy.
A related point is that framing the governing liability determinant as a rule
encourages trial courts to play a gate-keeping role to prevent weaker cases from
reaching a jury. The Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita Electric
IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,' 17encourages such gate-keeping by trial
courts in complex antitrust cases. 11 In theory, Matsushitashould create a gatekeeping culture in both antitrust cases governed by rules and those governed by
standards, since trial courts are directed to inquire into the economic
plausibility of the plaintiff's claims before allowing them to go to a jury. 19 In
practice, however, courts have resisted using Matsushitato justify the grant of
summary judgment or directed verdict in cases involving practices governed by
the rule of reason or generalized monopolization standards.120 They have been
more apt to invoke their gate-keeping function in cases involving rules, whether

conclusive."); 16 C.F.R. §3.54(a) (2001) (granting the Commission the authority "upon appeal
from or review of an initial decision" to "exercise all the powers which it could have exercised if
it had made the initial decision"). However, where the FTC's factual findings differ from those
of the AL, the court of appeals gives less deference to the agency's factual findings, which
gives the Commission some incentive to avoid overruling its ALJs on questions of fact. See
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We may, however,
examine the FTC's findings more closely where they differ from those of the ALT.").
117. See Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,593 (1986)
(noting previous findings that "courts should not permit fact finders to infer conspiracies when
such inferences are implausible" and finding that "there is little reason to be concerned that by
granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or
ambiguous, courts will encourage such conspiracies").
118. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether courts should play
that gate-keeping role as early as the motion to dismiss stage of antitrust litigation. See Bell Atl.
v. Twombley, 425 F.3d 99 (2006) (2d Cir. 2005), cert.granted, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (posing
the question whether parallel competitive conduct and an assertion that such conduct is the
result of a conspiracy is sufficient for a claim under § I of the Sherman Act).
119. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (citing Matsushitafor the proposition that
courts should not allow juries to infer conspiracies when the conspiracy would be "implausible,"
thus implying that the court must first discern whether the conspiracy is in fact implausible).
120. See, e.g., Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499,511-12 (4th Cir.
2002) (vacating a summary judgment award because the district court failed to develop a
sufficient factual record); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639
(10th Cir. 1987) (reversing summary judgment because sufficient evidence was offered to
support an antitrust violation unlike Matsushita), reh 'g granted, 787 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.
1986). But see Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1988)
(affirming grant of summary judgment for failure to raise a genuine issue of fact).
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prohibitory or exculpatory, such as the per se prohibition on price fixing12' and
the below-cost pricing rule for predatory pricing. 122Some courts have explicitly
distinguished between the use of the Matsushita"plausibility" screen in alleged
conspiracy cases (bound by a per se rule) and tying cases like Kodak where,
although a per se rule nominally applies, economic analysis rather than a priori
legal categories is generally dispositive.123 Courts are more comfortable
playing gatekeeper to the jury when a formalized rule rather than an amorphous
standard supplies the liability determinant.
Encouraging trial courts to play a stronger gatekeeping role has an
enormous practical effect on antitrust litigation. Between 2001 and 2005,
plaintiffs initiated a fairly stable number of private antitrust cases in federal
court, ranging from 723 to 826.'24 In 2005, 707 of the 818 cases filed were
121.
See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 378 (3d Cir. 2004)
(affirming summary judgment of price fixing allegation of automotive replacement glass based
on inadequate evidence but reversing summary judgment of price fixing allegation against Flat
Glass, finding sufficient evidence to send the issue to ajury); InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P.,
340 F.3d 144, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment because the evidence as a
whole "could not lead to the reasonableinference by a jury that [defendant] participated in an
antitrust conspiracy"); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp., 203 F.3d 1028, 1038 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (affirming summary judgment for failure to offer enough evidence to establish
an antitrust violation); Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., 201 F.3d 436,
1999 U.S. APP. LEXIS 21487 at *14 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision per curiam)
(finding that because plaintiffs alleged a per se antitrust violation it was unnecessary to review
the case under the rule of reason standard before affirming judgment). But see Rossi v.
Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 472-75 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that defendants'
alleged behavior would be per se illegal as group boycott if proven and denying summary
judgment after conducting "Matsushita implausibility" analysis).
122. See, e.g., Steams Airport Equip. Co., v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir.
1999) (affirming summary judgment because plaintiff failed to produce enough evidence to
meet the high standard for showing a predatory pricing scheme); Advo, Inc. v. Phila.
Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that plaintiff's failure to
sufficiently support the allegation of predatory pricing was sufficient to affirm summary
judgment); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.
1988) (finding plaintiffs' predatory pricing claim implausible and thereby affirming directed
verdict for defendants); United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1218 (D. Kan.
2001) (granting summaryjudgment because the government failed to show below-cost pricing),
af'd, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 944 F. Supp.
66, 69 (D. Mass. 1996) (granting summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to meet the
"heightened pleading requirements of Matsushita"),qff'd, 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998). Butsee
Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof I Publ'ns, 63 F.3d
1540, 1549 (10th Cir. 1995) (ruling for the plaintiffs).
123. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,466-67 (1992)
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are
generally disfavored in antitrust law.").
124. FED. JUDICIARY, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-2A: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY
NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE

12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 20,2004 THROUGH 2005
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terminated, 203 were terminated without court action-by settlement or
voluntary dismissal, 432 were dismissed by the court before trial, presumably
either on a motion to dismiss or summary judgment, and only 12 cases, 1.7% of

all cases terminated, reached
a trial. 125 Of those 12 cases that reached trial, only
126

9 were tried to juries.
The upshot is that very few antitrust cases ever make it to trial. Practically
speaking, defendants have two shots to have the case dismissed -on a motion
to dismiss and for summary judgment-before they must pay a substantial sum
to settle. The risk, unpredictability, and potentially huge damages awards from
trials assure that defendants will settle if the case survives summary judgment.
When the liability determinant is framed as a standard, this increases the
effective value of plaintiff s claims by making it more likely that the plaintiff's
case will survive the two principal procedural hurdles to exacting a favorable
settlement.
Finally, rules signal a greater importance for lawyers, and standards signal
a greater role for economists in antitrust adjudication. The rising influence of
economists in the antitrust agencies coincided with, and probably influenced,
the shift from rules to standards. 127 While economists play a somewhat
at 162, [hereinafter 2005 TABLE C-2A], http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/
c2a.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). By
contrast, the federal government only initiated 17 civil antitrust lawsuits in 2005 and initiates
approximately 10 to 25 criminal antitrust cases per year. See FED. JUDICIARY, 2005 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-2A:
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS---CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION ANDNATURE OF
SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 THROUGH 2005, at 159,
http://www.uscourts.ogv/judbus2005/appendices/c2.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (showing
that in 2005 the United States was plaintiff in 17 antitrust suits and a defendant in 5 suits) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also FED. JUDICIARY 2005 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE D-2: U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS-CRIMINAL CASES COMMENCED, BY MAJOR OFFENSE (EXCLUDING TRANSFERS),
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 THROUGH 2005 at 227,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/ appendices/d2.pdf(last visited Oct. 23,2006) (indicating
that the government brought 25 criminal cases in 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
125. See 2005 TABLE C-2A, supra note 124, at 162 (indicating that 818 private antitrust
suits were filed in 2005); see also FED. JUDICIARY, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, TABLE C-4: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS--CIVIL
CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT & ACTION TAKEN, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 20, 2005 at 183, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/c4.pdf
(last visited Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 TABLE C-4] (providing statistical information
regarding the termination of cases filed in 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
126. 2005 TABLE C-4, supra note 125, at 183.
127. See Marc Allen Eisner & Kenneth J. Meier, PresidentialControl Versus Bureaucratic
Power: Explainingthe Reagan Revolution in Antitrust, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 269,282-84 (1990)
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important role in cases governed by rules (for example, to explain whether a
price was below cost or a pattern of parallel prices supports an inference of
collusion), their testimony is more likely to be curtailed or excluded when the
governing liability criteria are articulated as rules rather than as standards.
Rules are imperative-they can be "violated," "broken," "ignored," and
"disregarded." Standards are subjective-they ask a question that can be
answered in any number of ways. In a case governed by a rule, an economist
who disagrees with some premise in the rule is liable to find his testimony
rejected by the court.' 28 In a case governed by a standard, the gate-keeping
function of the court will generally be limited to ensuring the scientific
reliability of the economist's presentation. 2 9 It is hard to reject an economist's
testimony for being contrary to a standard when the standard is framed in terms
like "reasonableness" and "exclusionary."
The choice between rules and standards matters in antitrust. As an
expression of legal culture, articulation of antitrust law as rule prejudges many
outcomes, pushes ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy, encourages
judges to play a stronger gate-keeping role, and widens the scope of allowable
economic testimony and other evidence. Even if it turns out that the "rules"
governing these practices are as indeterminate and malleable as Hart and
Wittgenstein's comments on language would suggest, 30 antitrust judges
perform their legal-cultural roles differently when the liability determinant is
framed as a rule than when it is framed as a standard.
IV. Efficiency Considerations
So far we have seen that antitrust is moving in the direction of flexible,
post hoc standards and that this has significant consequences for antitrust
adjudication. Is this movement desirable? The answer depends in part on what
(arguing that the changing antitrust policy of the Department of Justice in the 1980s was caused
by the hiring of more economists in the Antitrust Division).
128. See, e.g., Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2003) (affirming exclusion of testimony of economist who failed to "differentiate between
lawful, conscious parallelism and collusive price fixing"); Info. Res., Inc. v. The Dunn &
Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp. 2d 307, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (excluding expert's testimony to
the extent he could not show that defendant's prices were below variable cost).
129. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ("[Tlhe objective of
[the gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is
to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor... [as] in the relevant
field.").
130. Supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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normative goals one uses to measure the success of competition policy. If
allocative efficiency is the goal, as generally assumed today,' 3 ' the movement
toward standards is not unambiguously positive. The effects of such a
transition are felt both within litigation in terms of the costs and accuracy of
adjudication and within the realm of market behavior because of the varying
incentive effects of rules and standards. This Part considers the different ways
in which the choice between antitrust rules and standards affects the efficiency
outcomes of the antitrust
enterprise and concludes with decisional principles to
32
guide the choice.

A. Costs of Promulgatingand Administering the Legal Command
Louis Kaplow has formulated an economic model in which the choice
between rules and standards turns on the costs of promulgating and
administering the law and the incentive effects caused by the choice between
the two. 133 Kaplow observes that when a legal command will be applied
frequently, costs are minimized by framing the command as a rule since there
are economies of scale to figuring out the optimal content of law ex ante. 34
Conversely, when the legal command will be applied infrequently, it may be
less costly to wait and see whether a particular circumstance actually arises
before deciding on the content of the legal command. 135 The costs of the rules
versus standards choice is also affected by the degree to which individuals
subject to the command acquire legal advice ex ante. In general, it is less costly
for individuals to acquire knowledge about rules, and the acquisition of the
knowledge about rules
makes it more likely that individuals will conform their
136
law.
the
to
behavior
131.

See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing how efficiency has become

a primary goal in antitrust adjudication).
132. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984) (distinguishing between "decision
rules" that govern governmental decision-making and "conduct rules" that govern the conduct of
regulated actors).
133. See Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards,supra note 11, at 621 ("The central factor
influencing the desirability of rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will govern
conduct.").
134. See id. at 577 ("[T]he greater the frequency with which a legal command will apply,
the more desirable rules tend to be relative to standards. This result arises because promulgation
costs are borne only once, whereas efforts to comply with and action to enforce the law may
occur rarely or often.").
135. See id. ("Rules cost more to promulgate; standards cost more to enforce.").
136. See id. ("[R]ules' benefits arise from two sources: Individuals may spend less
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Antitrust law applies to a finite number of archetypes of industrial
behavior: vertical resale price maintenance; tying; merger; refusal to deal;
below-cost pricing; exclusive dealing; joint venture; territorial allocation; patent
pooling; and perhaps twenty or thirty more. Business transactions occur within
each of these categories with high frequency. The financial stakes from
running afoul of the law-felony convictions, treble damages, attorneys fees,
stock price declines-are high compared to the (also not inexpensive) cost of
legal advice. Following Kaplow's model, there are economies of scale to be
achieved by ex ante promulgation of the relevant legal command as to these
behavioral archetypes and a high likelihood that the subjects of the legal
command will acquire knowledge about the legal command.
One objection to antitrust rules governing industrial archetypes is that they
could not possibly cover every category of potentially anticompetitive conduct.
Hence, the D.C. Circuit admonished, "'Anticompetitive conduct' can come in
too many different forms, and is too dependent upon context, for any court or
commentator ever to have enumerated all the varieties." 137 This maxim makes
sense when understood as an admonition against attempting to catalogue in
advance every possible permutation of antitrust conduct and specifying its
liability determinants-that would be excessively costly for infrequently
practiced forms of anticompetitive behavior. But the maxim does not make
sense as applied to archetypal industrial behavior that is frequently the subject
of antitrust litigation. In its recent SpiritAirlines decision, the Sixth Circuit
invoked the CaribbeanBroadcastingmaxim to explain why Northwest Airlines
could be liable for lowering its price on its Detroit-Philadelphia and DetroitBoston flights. 138 According to the court, even if the lowering of the prices did
not amount to predatory pricing, that fact should not be dispositive on liability
since anticompetitive conduct can take forms other than predatory pricing. But
the alleged conduct at issue was archetypal predation-lowering price to drive
out a rival-which has been the subject of hundreds of predation cases which
have yielded well-known predatory pricing liability rules. It is no reason to
avoid framing or applying liability rules as to paradigmatic and frequent

in learning the content of the law, and individuals may become better informed about rules than
standards and thus better conform their behavior to the law.").
137. Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
138. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951 (2005) (stating that
the lower court's finding that Northwest's prices were not below the average variable cost, did
not conclude the analysis as to whether or not there was an antitrust violation).
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occurrences if it would be too costly to frame rules for non-paradigmatic and

infrequent occurrences.139
There are difficulties in applying this cost-based preference for rules in
paradigmatic cases. Easterbrook rightly complains that the standard-based
approach to antitrust creates high litigation costs, 140 but also does not want to
return to the per se rule, which he finds excessively interventionist. 14 Rather,
Easterbrook proposes a series of strong, but not quite rule-like, presumptions,
such as the use of a market-power screen and a requirement that plaintiff
"demonstrate that the defendant's practices are capable of enriching the
defendant by harming consumers."'142 These presumptions, however, can be
every bit as vague as the rule of reason. How does one know whether a firm
has market power without defining a relevant market? 43 How does one know
whether the defendant's practices are capable of enriching defendant by
harming consumers without analyzing the actual effects of the conduct on
prices and output levels?
So here lies a dilemma. Per se rules of illegality are often vastly overbroad
but an open-ended rule of reason approach would create excessive litigation
costs and uncertainty. Clear rules are necessary to provide optimal incentives
to engage in beneficial competitive behavior and reduce litigation costs but
relatively few forms of industrial behavior should be negatively sanctioned

139. The Sixth Circuit seemed to believe that Northwest's conduct was distinguishable
from ordinary predation because Northwest had not only lowered its price but added capacity to
absorb demand diverted from Spirit. Id. at 951. That distinction makes no sense. Every
predator will have to expand its capacity to absorb the business diverted from the prey and every
predator facing a downward sloping demand curve will have to further expand its output to
absorb new demand occasioned by the lower price. Lowering price and adding capacity go
hand in hand in virtually every predation case.
140. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1984)
("When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive .... Litigation costs are the product of
vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in
antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.").
141. See id. at 10 ("As time goes by, fewer and fewer things seem appropriate for per se
condemnation.").
142. Id.at 17-18.
143. Easterbrook is confident that the market definition question can often be answered
without resort to a full market definition inquiry, which he rightly identifies as a "fool's errand."
Id. at 22. He believes that it is possible to "ascertain power directly" by using "either evidence
of inability to raise price or evidence of price covariance between the defendant's goods and the
products of rivals." Id. Easterbrook is right: A court may be able to rule out the possibility that
the defendant has market power without reaching a definitive conclusion as to what is the
relevant market in some platonic sense, but the tools he describes to conduct the inquiry are the
same sorts of fact-intensive, economically complex tools ordinarily used in market definition
inquiries.
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without a careful inquiry into their motivation and market effects. As in most
"rules versus standards" discussions, the debate quickly reaches a stalemate.
The solution, though imperfect, is to use bright-line rules as immunizing
devices for broad swaths of industrial behavior while preserving a role for
standards in determining liability for conduct falling outside of the safe harbors
created by the rules. For many categories of conduct, such an approach
minimizes the cost of configuring the law because the rule itself supplies a
conclusive answer of no liability or presents a safe harbor that defendants can
elect in order to minimize the likelihood of litigation. For example, specifying
that a firm cannot be held liable for tying unless it has at least a 50% market
share in the tying market would provide a case-dispositive safe harbor that
could reduce litigation costs substantially in a large number of tying cases, even
though such costs would remain in cases where the defendant's market share
exceeded 50%. While it would also save costs to specify prohibitory rules for
cases falling outside the safe harbor (such as making tying per se unlawful if
the defendant's tying product market share exceeds 50%), the generalization of
such a rule would be vastly overbroad. Bright-line rules are most appropriate in
antitrust when used as immunizing devices. Relatively few categories of
conduct are unambiguously harmful and can be prohibited in equally
categorical terms.
Even as to the 50% market share immunizing rule, there remains the
question whether such a rule would be penny wise but pound foolish by saving
litigation costs while licensing firms to engage in socially costly tying behavior.
The next section considers that overinclusion question.
B. Underinclusion,Overinclusion, andIncentive Effects
There is an oddity in the timing of antitrust law's progression from rules to
standards. This transition, which has taken place during the same time frame as
antitrust law, has settled on allocative efficiency as its primary, if not sole,
objective. In the current dominant paradigm, antitrust law is supposed to deter
firms from engaging in collusive or exclusionary conduct resulting in
deadweight losses attendant to the output reductions that result from price
increases. 144 Antitrust today is primarily concerned with incentive effects and
144. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE para. 1.3b at 19-20 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that individuals who would
purchase the monopolized product at a competitive price but who would not pay the monopoly
price ultimately undertake an alternative transaction that is of lower private value, thereby
creating deadweight loss).
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not with compensation or distributive justice.145 But, if that is true, the case for
open-ended standards and post hoc adjudication seems prima facie weak. One
strong advantage of rules over standards is predictability, which matters most
when one is trying to incentivize appropriate behavior.
This last statement is subject to a caveat. Predictability may be
disadvantageous if the lawmaker is trying to limit behavior of dubious, but
uncertain, social value-sexual harassment for example. A legal rule
specifying every form of prohibited behavior would have the disadvantage of
providing a roadmap for boors to avoid liability while continuing to be boors.
One could respond by adding further boorish behavior to the list of
prohibitions, but sooner or later the rule-makers would begin to sense that
adding further categories to the list would be overly cumbersome and dilute the
seriousness of more offensive categories of behavior already on the list. By
instead framing the liability determinant vaguely, 46 the EEOC has discouraged
a wide range of behavior that has low social value but might not be prohibited
if all forms of misbehavior were catalogued in advance. So uncertainty about
the legal determinant can have healthy deterrent effects.
Antitrust is not that way. It regulates business behavior that generally has
high social value but is somewhat "tipsy"-at a certain point, the conduct tips
suddenly from beneficial to harmful. For example, lowering prices is highly
socially valuable until suddenly they are so low that competitors are driven out
of the market leading to long-term price increases; 47 product innovation is
highly socially valuable until the new design abruptly shuts out competitors

from an after-market;

48 cross-licensing

patented technology lowers production

145. On the trade-offs between total social welfare (i.e., efficiency) and consumer welfare,
see Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
EcON. REv. 18 (1968), Herbert Hovenkamp, DistributiveJustice and the Antitrust Laws, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1,4-5 (1982), and Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals ofAntitrust:
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and TechnologicalProgress,62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1032-33
(1987). On the predominance of total welfare concerns in antitrust today, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9-32 (2d ed. 2001). For a contrary v'iew, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68-69 (1982).
146. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2006) (defining sexual harassment as "fulnwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature [that create] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment").
147. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradoxof PredatoryPricing,91 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3
(2005) ("Society considers predation socially harmful because the artificially low prices oftoday
drive out competitors and allow the high prices of tomorrow.").
148. See Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
1121, 1142 (1983) (arguing that complex predatory pricing tests encourage increased litigation
and consequently lower innovative activity); Kara E. Harchuck, Note, Microsoft IV: The
Dangersto Innovation Posed by the IrresponsibleApplication of a Rule ofReason Analysis to
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costs and improves quality until it becomes a mechanism for price-fixing;
and information exchange between competitors lowers search costs and helps
firms rationalize production decisions until it tips over and facilitates
cartelization.15 0 Antitrust is not a field in which unpredictability of litigation
outcomes is beneficial because chilling broad categories of low-value behavior
is desirable. Most of the conduct adjacent to the harmful conduct is valuable.
Predictability in antitrust is important, but it is not sufficient to justify
rules even for a system concerned primarily with incentive effects. If the rules
cannot be framed to correspond closely to socially optimal behavioral criteria,
then the rules will provide predictability but not the right incentives. Broad
rules often fail to capture socially optimal outcomes. The 55 mile-per-hour
speed limit slows down some drivers who would be perfectly safe at 70 and
encourages some drivers who are dangerous at any speed over 40 to drive more
quickly. Rules tend toward over- and under-inclusion, which dulls the
advantage of their predictability. The "rules versus standards" debate thus
descends into the following kind of stalemate: Rules, more than standards,
provide ex ante notice of the law's command and therefore enable the law's
subjects to conform their behavior to its dictates.' 5' This is widely thought to
be a virtue of rules, particularly if one is concerned about due process values or
deterring undesirable behavior. 15 2 But standards are more likely than rules to

ProductDesign Claims,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 395, 436 (2002) (arguing that most courts favor new
innovations, however, courts can have a chilling effect on innovation if they make improper
rulings on the superiority of new products).
149. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, PatentPools, and
StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 130 (Adam B. Jaffe et al.
eds., 2001) ("The traditional concern with crosslicenses among competitors is that running
royalties will be used as a device to elevate prices and effect a cartel.").
150. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333,353 (1969) (holding that
an informal arrangement among corrugated container manufacturers to share bid information on
specific customer contracts was sufficient to find an unlawful restraint oftrade); Am. Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921) (affirming the district court's
finding that a manufacturers' association information-sharing plan was an unlawful restraint of
trade that contributed to a significant decrease in production and increase in prices).
151. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards,and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207,68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1230 (1982) (arguing that rules give
actors security in their actions and protect them against litigation uncertainty).
152. Due process is particularly important when the sanction for violation is criminal
punishment including lengthy incarceration. It is thus not surprising that the current
enforcement practice of the federal government is not to prosecute criminally any behavior other
than hard-core cartels, which are subject to a sharply delineated per se rule. See Dep't of
Justice, PriceFixing,BidRigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What
to Look Forat 2, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf (providing common
characteristics of price-fixing and bid-rigging schemes, both of which are per se violations of
the Sherman Act).
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locate the precise dividing line between desirable and undesirable behavior. 3
Rules are more likely than standards to be overinclusive or underinclusive.
Finally, promulgation of law as a standard is more likely than promulgation of
law as a rule to result in adjudicatory error, since there are more variables to
consider and the relationship between the variables is exponentially more
complex.
Let us examine these propositions more closely with a careful eye on the
peculiarities of antitrust law. If antitrust law is framed in a rule-like way, it is
more likely that firms will be able to avoid some of the inefficient and
consumer-harming behavior with which antitrust law is concerned because they
will have clearer advance guidance. But because the rules will necessarily be
over- and under-inclusive,15 4 rent-seeking firms will find the loopholes and
zones of underinclusion and exploit them to cause inefficiencies and harm to
consumers. At the same time, some "innocent" firms will either be penalized
for engaging in conduct that is efficient and does not harm consumers or will
simply forego that conduct, finding less efficient and consumer-friendly ways
of doing business. At this level of generality, the argument between rules and
standards still reaches a draw.
The impasse can be broken by considering the remedial features of
antitrust law. In a civil case, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover
automatically trebled damages. 55 To the extent that the antitrust violation was
difficult to detect, this multiplier may simply ensure that antitrust violations do
not have a positive expected value. 5 6 But apart from hard-core price fixing or
bid rigging cartels and similar conspiracies, the conduct giving rise to many
antitrust violations is not difficult to detect because many violations arise from

153. In other words, standards may be more accurate than rules as adjudicatory devices.
On the other hand, as Derek Bok noted in the merger context, "consideration of all relevant facts
may actually detract from the accuracy" of an adjudicatory decision. Derek C. Bok, Section 7of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 295 (1960);
see also HOvENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 53 (observing that

"stripped-down models that isolate essential variables often have greater predictive power than
more complex explanations that attempt to take every quirk into account").
154.

See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703,

710 (1991) (arguing that "rules are necessarily under- and over-inclusive with respectto the sets
of reasonsthat support orgroundthem"); SCHAUER, supranote 11, at 31-34 (describing rules
as entrenched generalizations likely to be under- and over-inclusive in particular cases).
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.., shall recover threefold the
damages sustained by him....").
156. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
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publicly conspicuous business practices. 157 While it may be difficult for the
court to determine whether to find the conduct a violation, such adjudicatory
uncertainty is just as likely to result in a false positive as a false negative, so the
ex ante incentive effects are a wash. 5 8
Even where there is only a one in three chance that the conduct will be
detected, other costs of an adverse judgment deter the antitrust violation.
Prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorneys fees from the
defendant, but the defendant does not have a reciprocal right.159 This unilateral
fee shifting comes on top of the costs that the defendant incurs to defend the
suit, including not only hiring attorneys and economists but the time and effort
of its executives called upon to aid in the defense of the case, produce
documents, and testify in deposition or at trial. And then there are reputational
effects from an adverse judgment. The filing of an antitrust lawsuit may cause
a decline in the defendant's stock price exceeding the net present value of the
expected damages judgment and costs of defense (since shareholders may take
the lawsuit as a signal of careless or incompetent managers).' 60 The intra-firm
reputation, status, and compensation of individual managers may be at risk,
causing them to be particularly careful
to avoid actions that would bring about
16 1
firn.
the
to
judgment
adverse
an

157. For example, the Visa and Mastercard bylaw requiring issuer banks not to issue other
credit cards had been in place for years, and approved by an earlier court of appeals decision,
before the Second Circuit disapproved it under the rule of reason in the Department of Justice
action. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963-64 (10th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting per se review in favor of rule of reason review). With thousands of participating
banks, it is inconceivable that the bylaw could have remained a secret. See also, Crane, supra
note 147, at 40 (discussing how predatory pricing relies on reputation effects to be successful,
and therefore is unlikely to be undetected).
158. Except to the extent that the relevant subjects of the law are risk averse, in which case
the difficulty in predicting how a court will decide will prevent some firms from engaging in the
conduct.
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (allowing plaintiffs hurt by antitrust violations to recover
costs and reasonable attorney's fees in addition to damages).
160. See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, FurtherEvidence on Investor
Overreactionand Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. PAPERS & PROC. 557, 557-58, 577-79
(1987) (finding that people place too much importance on recent stock data and not enough on
base rate data); Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?,40 J. FIN. PAPERS & PROc. 793, 799 (1985) (arguing that "loser" portfolios in the
stock market fair better than "winner" portfolios due to overreaction).
161. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144-45 (2000) ("[Mianagers typically have a nontrivial fraction
of their wealth in firm-specific human capital and thus are concerned about the variability of
total firm value. ..

").
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Antitrust law is thus powerfully structured to deter violations. Now
consider the implications for underinclusion and overinclusion. Say that there
is a dividing line x that represents the exact point of demarcation between
conduct that is socially desirable and undesirable. The function of a standard is
to locate x as closely as possible. Ex ante, the subject of the standard-let us
call her A-does not know exactly where x will fall but makes her own
estimate. Having located her own estimate aty, she will only approachy to the
point that the gains from her approach exceed the probability that she will
unknowingly have crossed x, multiplied by the costs of having crossed x. Since
the costs of crossing x are large, A will keep a safe distance from y. If A's
information about the location ofx was relatively accurate, A will have forgone
some socially desirable behavior to avoid coming close to x.
Framing the law as a rule gives A a better indication of how she is entitled
to behave. It does not completely solve the problem because there is some
residual uncertainty about how the rule will be enforced and some risk of
adjudicatory error. Let us assume that adjudicatory error is equally likely to be
type one (false negative) as type two (false positive). The cost of a type two
error (treble damages, attorneys fees, reputation effects) are usually going to be
greater to A than the benefits of a type one error (monopoly profits). 62 So A
will still back away somewhat from the dividing line specified by the rule.
Because it must be formulated ex ante, without knowledge of all of the
facts, and for a class of conduct rather than a particular case, the rule will tend
to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both. But, because of the remedial
structure of antitrust law, underinclusion may cost less than underinclusion
would in other circumstances. The uncertainty about application and the risk of
adjudicatory error, multiplied by the heavy cost of an adverse judgment, will
cause A to keep away from the line established by an underinclusive rule.
Suppose again that x marks the exact dividing line between socially desirable
and undesirable behavior. If the rule is framed to create liability at x + 1,
subjects of the rule, deterred by expected costs that exceed expected gains from
approaching the line and risk aversion, may come no closer than x. Hence, the
judge or legislator framing antitrust as a rule can afford to be deliberately
underinclusive without creating suboptimal deterrence.
One could argue that it is also possible to be underinclusive when framing
standards. In order to create optimal incentives given the remedial structure of
antitrust law, the courts could signal loudly that they will be underinclusive
when applying standards after the fact. 163 But that is still a much less certain
162.
163.

Crane, supra note 147, at 41.
The Supreme Court has done this with predatory pricing law, announcing that it views
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way to affect incentives than announcing an underinclusive rule. Another
solution is to raise the quantum of evidence necessary to find a violation (such
as requiring clear and convincing evidence),' 64 but this strategy usually will be
less successful than announcing underinclusive rules, since the margin of error
in predicting outcomes will be larger. The ex post nature of the liability
determination that comes with standards weakens the ex ante incentive effects
of trying to announce the standards in an underinclusive way.
Things are somewhat different when it comes to public enforcement.
Criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act must occur in the realm of rules, as it
in fact does. 65 The threat of criminal penalties coupled with unpredictable
standards and risk aversion would create excessive deterrence, and due process
values would be violated by announcing criminal punishment for crimes that
were determined based on complex economic analysis after the fact. On the
other hand, standards look more attractive than rules when the government is
suing for injunctive relief directed at future conduct. 66 The risk of
overdeterring socially beneficial conduct becomes much smaller and the value
of avoiding over- or under-inclusion increases since the legal command will be
applied to the future behavior of a specific person whose unique circumstances
are known. 16 7 The purpose of antitrust law is no longer to create optimal
incentives but rather to engage in command-and-control directives with respect
to future behavior. Further, in injunctive actions by the government, the party
ultimately deciding the facts is likely to be either an administrative law judge or
a federal district judge, which reduces the probability of adjudicatory error
endemic when juries apply complex balancing tests. Thus, given the remedial
predation claims with suspicion and that they are presumptively unlikely to succeed. See
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993)
(explaining that the plaintiff's high burden of proof in predatory pricing cases serves to protect
price competition); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594-95
(1986) (reasoning that an underinclusive rule concerning predatory pricing schemes is
appropriate because the low success rate for such schemes "tends to make [them] selfdeterring").
164. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEo. L.J. 1743, 1758
(2005) (arguing that the effects of unavoidable overenforcement can be tempered by, inter alia,
"heightened standards of proof").
165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government's
policy regarding criminal prosecution of those who violate the Sherman Act).
166. In principle, the same is true when a private plaintiff sues only for injunctive relief,
although (with the occasional ex ante private challenge to a merger) that is a very rare
occurrence in antitrust.
167. See Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards,supra note 11, at 606 (noting that "ifextremely
harmful activities are to be permanently enjoined ... it is valuable to invest resources to make
accurate determinations in adjudication even if the enhanced accuracy does not affect ex ante
behavior").
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structure of U.S. antitrust laws, there is a strong case to be made for liability
rules for private adjudication and liability
standards for public adjudication
68
where prospective relief is sought.
C. Choice of Ultimate Decision-Maker

In Kaplow's model, the content of law is generally assumed to be the same
whether the decision is made ex post (as a rule) or ex ante (as a standard). 169 In
antitrust, however, the denomination of law as rule or standard may affect the
allocation of ultimate decision-making authority and, hence, the content of the
liability determinant. As discussed in Part II, the effect of announcing the law
as a standard is generally to push ultimate decision-making in individual cases
down the legal hierarchy-in the direction of the trial court, administrative law
judge, or the jury-and the effect of announcing the law as a standard is
generally to push ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy-in the
direction of the court of appeals. 70 If the institutional actors lower in the legal

168. Private plaintiffs might try to take advantage of collateral estoppel principles to claim
that a judgment in favor of the government conclusively determines the defendant's liability in a
subsequent private action for treble damages, thus reviving the overdeterrence concerns. See,
e.g., In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig. 355 F.3d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that certain
factual findings made by the district court in Department of Justice Microsoft litigation were
binding on Microsoft in subsequent private actions for damages). However, this problem can be
addressed doctrinally by providing that only findings of fact made in the governmental litigation
would be binding on the defendant in the subsequent private case because the law applied in the
two cases would be different.
169. Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 11, at 570. However, Kaplow
recognizes that this assumption is "often unrealistic." Id.
170. Congress may also specify the content of antirust law through legislation. Putting
aside the treble damages remedy, which is decisively rule-like (as compared to open-ended
punitive damages standards), most of the important concepts in the federal antitrust statutes are
articulated as open-ended standards. The choice between adjudicatory standards is thus
delegated to the courts through the medium of common law development. See Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1985)
(describing antitrust statutes as delegating to courts power to develop common law of antitrust);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) ("The Sherman
Act... effectively authorize[s] courts to create new lines of common law."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1696, 1705 (1986) ("The Sherman
Act set up a common law system in antitrust."). This progression is not inevitable. The
Antitrust Modernization Commission is presently studying a vast array of substantive and
procedural antitrust questions and could recommend to Congress the adoption of legislation
creating legislative rules for various matters. See Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (creating a commission empowered to
examine the antitrust laws and recommend changes). Updates on the Commission's progress
are available online at http://www.amc.gov.
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hierarchy tend to have different levels of competence or systemic biases from
those in the upper levels, the choice of legal form may affect the formulation
and application of law.
There is no reason to believe that courts of appeals and district courts
generally have different systemic biases, except in the limited sense that court
of appeals judges may be screened more rigorously during their Senate
confirmations and, therefore, tend slightly more toward the political center than
district court judges. 171 There may be a wider competence gap, however,
particularly on complex questions of industrial policy. Court of appeals judges
are somewhat more likely than district judges to be drawn from academia or
policy-oriented political posts, whereas district judges are more likely to have
gained their seat through service as a prosecutor, public defender, or litigator in
a law firm. 72 To the extent that formulation of law as rule tends to push
ultimate decision-making up the legal hierarchy toward appellate judges, the
formulation of complex industrial policy as rule may be desirable, although the
effect may be small.
The effect is considerably larger when it comes to the allocation of
responsibilities to jurors. First, some evidence indicates that juries tend to be
predisposed against dominant firms, particularly when the dominant firm has
taken harsh (although not necessarily anticompetitive) action against a smaller
rival.i7 3 Judicial opinions often warn against the dangers of relying on "bad
intent" evidence consisting of violent metaphors culled from internal business
memoranda precisely because this is the sort of evidence that jurors 1tend
to
74
focus on in otherwise dull antitrust cases that they do not understand.
171. Appellate court nominations are more likely than district court nominations to be
politically contentious. See Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary: Like
Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 302 (2003) (describing the political conflicts
surrounding appellate court nominations). One result of the increasing politicization of the
judicial nomination process has been to produce politically centrist circuit court judges.
Richard A. Posner, A PoliticalCourt, 119 HARv. L. REv. 31, 71 (2005).
172. See generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997). Of course, both trial judges and court
of appeals judges often acquire their posts through political patronage, but patronage is often
dispensed along the lines discussed.
173. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and
Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 51, 52-59 (1995) (providing post-trial quotes from jurors that
revealed prejudice against the larger firm in the case study); Crane, supra note 147, at 15
("Seeing the inner workings of an aggressive pricing campaign by a 'big company' against a
smaller new entrant may inflame jurors into awarding large damages."). But see VALERIE P.
HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 141-56 (2000)
(questioning the claim that juries tend to be biased against big businesses).

174. See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding "colorful, vigorous hyperbole" in corporate documents insufficient evidence to
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Further, even ifjurors have no systemic biases, they are less competent on
average than judges to decide complex matters of microeconomics, regulatory
policy, and industrial organization. This is not to say that jurors are never
competent in antitrust cases. In this regard, it may be useful to distinguish
between two kinds of factual determinations thatjuries are called upon to make:
personal facts and economic facts. Personal facts concern the motivations and
conduct of the people who made the relevant business decisions, for example
the truthfulness of witnesses, whether the relevant people took certain actions
such as attending meetings, discussing certain topics, or placing telephone calls,
whether they had knowledge of specified information as of a certain date, and
whether they intended to bring about certain effects. Economic facts concern
the efficiency and economic effects of conduct, for example, whether a
particular free-riding concern is justified, whether a particular practice could
exclude an equally efficient competitor, whether the defendant has market
power, and whether specified conduct was more likely to contract or expand
output. Personal facts require no great business sophistication and are likely to
be within the understanding of an ordinaryjuror. Economic facts often involve
contested economic theories and are far outside the educational, experiential,
and intellectual range of the ordinary juror.
Cases governed by rules are more likely to be resolved by reference to
personal facts than those governed by standards. For example, price fixing
cases-bound by a per se rule-tum on whether the defendants agreed on
price, a matter that does not necessarily involve complex economic theory.
Although the jurors may still be exposed to conflicting economic testimony
propounded to explain how parallel prices could (or could not) have emerged
absent (or with) an agreement, the economic testimony will usually be merely
corroborative of more direct evidence, such as fact witness testimony, diaries,
phone logs, itineraries, and correspondence. 75 Such cases raise fairly ordinary
support a predatory pricing claim); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d

1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that both lawyers and jurors often misunderstand the
evidentiary significance of corporate statements showing an intent to defeat a competitor);
Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101, 1113 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that the stated "desire to crush a competitor, standing alone, is insufficient
to make out a violation of the antitrust laws"); Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel.
Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) ("That Western Union wanted to 'flush these turkeys'
tells us nothing about the lawfulness of its conduct."); see also POSNER, supra note 11, at 215
("Especially misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag to their superiors
about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are compelling
evidence of predatory intent to the naive.").
175. Where direct evidence of a conspiracy is lacking, circumstantial evidence tending to
exclude the possibility of independent action may be sufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy. See Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)
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questions about human nature and conduct not unlike other kinds of criminal
conspiracy cases. On the other hand, an open-ended monopolization jury
instruction like that given in LePage 's176-- did the defendant exclude the
plaintiff on some basis other than efficiency?17 7-makes liability turn on
economic facts that the average juror is ill-equipped to address. Suppose that
the defendant has used a particular practice as a means of price discrimination.
Asking the jury to decide whether this particular form of price discrimination is
likely to increase or decrease output-whether it is efficient or inefficient-is
unlikely to yield a very reliable 78
answer when this very matter is highly
contested among antitrust experts.
Antitrust rules sometimes also turn on economic facts,' 79 but standards
almost inevitably do so. This suggests that framing antitrust law as a standard
for cases in which each party has the right to demand a jury trial is problematic.
Not only will the jury be called upon to decide economic facts outside its
competence, but the designation of the law as a standard may influence the trial
judge and court of appeals to afford a greater degree of deference to the jury's
(often confused) determination. Rules have the virtue of presenting decisions
to jurors in a way that tends to involve personal facts. Rules also suggest a
stronger gate-keeping and sufficiency ofthe evidence reviewing role forjudges,
which minimizes the costs of adjudicative errors by jurors.
When it comes to public civil enforcement, framing the law as a standard
is more desirable because it signals that greater deference will be given to the
judgments of experts within the antitrust enforcement agencies, such as
administrative law judges and the Commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission, and to the testimony of economists.1 80 Privileging the testimony
("[B]usiness behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer
agreement."); Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939) (stating that the
government may "rely on inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged
conspirators").
176. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc).
177. Id. at167.
178. For a flavor of the debate, see Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and
Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v.
Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329) and Brief of Professor F.M.
Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent
Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
179. In Brooke Group, for example, the jury was called upon to apply the average variable
cost test-a rule. Post-verdict interviews revealed that the jurors found Brown & Williamson
liable for predatory pricing, even though the jurors did not understand the relevant rule. Austin,
supra note 173, at 53-60.
180. In his classic work on administrative discretion, Kenneth Culp Davis argues that a
major function of the FTC should be to frame rules. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 70-74
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of economists is problematic in cases likely to be decided by a jury because it
means deferring to the jury's uninformed choice between competing experts.
Unfettering economic testimony from strict liability rules is more desirable in
cases decided by antitrust specialists as fact-finders or even in bench trials
before federal district judges. The risk of adjudicatory error diminishes, and
the advantage of seeking the exact dividing line between socially beneficial and

harmful behavior increases.
D. Strategic ManipulationandPublic Choice

Antitrust law is susceptible to strategic misuse in two ways. First, antitrust
decision-makers may be subject to capture by regulated constituencies or others
interested in influencing the content of antitrust law for personal advantage.'81
Second, even if the content of antitrust law is correctly specified from a social

welfare perspective, there is a danger that regulated parties will use antitrust
litigation (or the threat of it) to achieve anticompetitive goals.1 82 The choice to

promulgate law as either rule or standard sometimes can affect the likelihood
that antitrust law will be strategically misused in either of these ways.
First, consider the likelihood that the creation of antitrust norms will be
unduly influenced-or "captured"-by special interests. 183 Most antitrust law

(arguing that due to the vagueness of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC should
provide guidance to businesses through promulgating rules). But there is only a limited
advantage to the FTC framing antitrust rules that will only apply to FTC actions because there is
no private right of action under the FTC Act. Rules are most needed to govern private damages
actions, not injunctive actions by the FTC.
181. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J. L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1985) (describing the ways in which antitrust laws can be used to
stifle competition); Malcolm B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger
Challenges, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST:

THE PUBLIC CHOICE

PERSPECTIVE 213-14 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995) (examining the
influence of private interests on FTC challenges to horizontal mergers).
182. See generally Crane, supra note 147; Edward A. Synder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse
of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff,90 MICH. L. REV. 551 (1991); R. Preston
McAfee & Nicholas V. Vakkur, The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws, (Jan. 27, 2004)
(unpublished working paper) (identifying seven ways that firms use antitrust laws against
competitors), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=594581 (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
183. Antitrust law creation could also be the subject of another kind of public choice
distortion-cycling or randomness-which may occur when numerous legislators consider
multiple options. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (195 1)
(illustrating the irrationality that results from using strict logic to construct a social consensus
from individual preference). My focus here is on the specification of antitrust law by the courts,
which entails a much smaller number of decision-makers and smaller range of decisional
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is created by the courts through a common law approach, 8 4 not by Congress
through statutes or the antitrust agencies through promulgation of
administrative regulations.18 5 The constitutional structure of the federal
judiciary-life tenure, irreduceable salary-is designed to create independence
and objectivity, but there are still opportunities for judicial capture.' 86 Amicus
curiae briefs by special interests can exert considerable influence on a court's
decision. 187 Affected constituencies frequently attempt to shape antitrust
decisions through a barrage of amicus curiae briefs joined by leading corporate
sectors (pharmaceutical companies, manufacturers, retailers, franchisees),
business associations, consumer groups, or the states. Intellectual or attitudinal
capture can also occur. The Chicago School's models hypothesizing the
efficiency of previously suspect business practices (such as vertical restraints,
tying, price discrimination, and predatory pricing) may have "captured" the
Supreme Court during the 1970s and 1980s, largely because the Chicago
School faced weak intellectual competition.18 8 This is not "capture" in the
usual sense--Chicago School scholars were not trying to influence the Court's

options.
184. See supranote 170 and accompanying text (citing three sources that discuss federal
courts' ability to create common law under the antitrust statutes).
185. The agencies do promulgate guidelines concerning their enforcement intentions which
can strongly influence business behavior. This is particularly true in merger cases where, due to
the importance of closing a deal quickly, opposition from the Federal Trade Commission or
Department of Justice can mean the death of a deal whether or not a court would ultimately
agree with the agencies' position.
186. See generally, Frank B. Cross, The Judiciaryand Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
355 (1999); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991); Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest Groups, in T1M
AMERICAN CouRTs: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335, 349 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson
eds., 1991).
187. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friendsof the Court: Examining the Influence ofAmicus
CuriaeParticipationin U.S. Supreme CourtLitigation, 38 LAw& Soc'Y REv. 807,828(2004)
(finding that amicus curiae participation increases litigation success); Joseph D. Kearny &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence ofAmicus CuriaeBriefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 743, 749 (2000) (reporting that amicus curiae briefs have an impact on Supreme Court
decisions).
188. See Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A DecisionTheoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 469-70 (2001) (explaining how the Supreme
Court was influenced by the Chicago School's theory that tying could foster competition). The
"Post-Chicago" School has not exerted as strong an influence on the courts, in part because it
continues to face strong intellectual resistance from the Chicago School. See id.at 470
(countering the Post-Chicago School's argument that tying is in fact anticompetitive); see also
Michael A. Carrier, Antitrust After the Interception: Of a Heroic Returnerand MyriadPaths,
55 STAN. L. REv. 287, 291 (2002) (book review) (critiquing Judge Posner's dismissal of the
Post-Chicago School's game theoretic assumptions).
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direction for personal advantage-but judicial outcomes can become distorted
ifjudges begin to rely too heavily on any single intellectual current just because
it consistently "wins" the argument against weaker theoretical rivals.
Rules, more than standards, invite collaborative efforts by special interests
to influence the outcome of judicial decisions. When the Supreme Court or
court of appeals frames antitrust law as a standard, it leaves most decisions
about that particular business practice to case-by-case, post hoc determination.
Industry sectors, labor groups, consumer advocates, or other special interests
have less to gain from seeking to influence any single litigated case involving a
standard, since the next case involving the same constituencies may be decided
differently when all of the relevant factors are weighed. 189 Framing the law as a
standard also lessens the chance for "capture" by any single intellectual school
of thought, since the law will be made in the interstices of litigated cases rather
than as a broad conceptual construct. By contrast, special interests have more
to gain from participating when the court's resolution will involve framing a
rule because that rule may predetermine many more future outcomes for those
constituencies. Framing antitrust law as a rule concentrates the stakes for larger
swaths of interests and, therefore, invites special interests to undertake
concentrated efforts to shape the rule.
These considerations militate in favor of antitrust standards rather than
rules, but the case is different when one considers the strategic manipulations
that can occur in litigation itself. Antitrust law is most subject to strategic
misuse by rent-seeking competitors when it is framed as an amorphous
standard. A growing literature shows that firms can strategically misuse
antitrust to coerce or induce their competitors to forgo engaging in practices
that are efficient but disadvantage the plaintiff.' 90 For example, a less efficient
firm might threaten a predatory pricing lawsuit against a more efficient firm to
discourage price-cutting; a single-product firm might threaten a tying lawsuit
against a diversified firm to discourage bundling; a technologically outdated
firm might threaten a monopolization lawsuit against an innovative rival to
discourage design innovation; or a firm making an inferior product might
threaten a monopolization lawsuit to prevent its rival from making disparaging
remarks. Such rent-seeking behavior is more likely to be successful when the
governing law is presented as a standard rather than as a rule because a
standard creates more adjudicatory uncertainty, and risk-averse defendants may
189. Framing the law as a standard also minimizes the number of cases on which the
Supreme Court grants certiorari, since it is harder to create circuit splits out of adjudications
under open-ended standards.
190. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (describing ways in which antitrust law
can be used to stifle competition).
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desist from an efficient practice even if it is likely to be vindicated through
litigation. Further, adjudication under a standard tends to prolong litigation and
increase its costs, which increases the chances that the litigation can be used as
a cover to organize tacit collusion between the parties. 19'
So, again, rules and standards reach a conceptual impasse. Standards are
preferable because they are less likely to cause judicial capture at a macro level,
but rules are preferable because they are less likely to encourage rent-seeking
litigation or litigation threats at a micro level. Neither one of these tendencies
is probably strong enough to warrant a general preference for rules or
standards, but some guiding principles can be drawn. The strategic misuse of
antitrust law by competitor plaintiffs is most likely to be a concern in
exclusionary practices cases. Competitors typically do not have standing to
assert antitrust claims in cases involving collusive but non-exclusionary
conduct since the plaintiff usually benefits from such conduct.' 92 In
exclusionary conduct cases, rules are particularly desirable because they
provide rent-seeking competitors with less opportunity to manipulate the
remedial structure of U.S. antitrust law to achieve anticompetitive gains.
Where strategic manipulation is less a concern, framing antitrust law as a
standard may lessen the likelihood that the content of the law will be distorted
through interest group pressures.
E. Synthesis andDecisionalPrinciples
The rules versus standards debate often ends in a stalemate because there
are so many potential variables, and it is difficult to know how to weigh
them.' 93 When a court breaks the impasse and chooses a rule or a standard (or
a legal norm that is more rule-like or standard-like), it usually must do so based
on an informed, but imprecise, judgment-what an earlier generation would
194
have called "wisdom"-about which approach is the lesser of two evils.
191. See Crane, supra note 147, at 16-25 (discussing the ways in which competitors may
achieve oligopolistic pricing).
192. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,337 (1990) (holding
that the competitor lacked antitrust injury and therefore could not challenge vertical minimum
price-fixing scheme since such a scheme would have worked to the competitor's advantage).
193. See Diver, supra note 11, at 70-71, 108 (discussing the difficulties of aggregating
tradeoffs between rules and standards into "an overall evaluation" and noting that "[c]ourts, as
much as politicians, must throw competing values on the scales and somehow total the score").
194. Colin Diver refers to this as "an irreducible core of legal controversy about rule
precision that yields only to an indwelling jurisprudential principle of fairness and propriety."
Id. at 107.
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Both rules and standards have costs. Weighing the various costs of rules and
standards in antitrust is difficult. Perhaps the most prudent course is to
articulate the paradigmatic instances where rules or standards are preferable and
leave the middle grounds ungeneralized.
Rules have the greatest advantage in governing classes of lawsuits likely to
be decided by juries and to result in overdeterrence due to the uncertainty of
standards or strategic abuse in litigation. Especially troubling is the trend in the
lower courts to leave private exclusionary conduct cases to post hoc, factThis commits ultimate decision-making about
specific determination.'"
economic facts to ill-equipped juries, threatens to chill vigorous competitive
behavior, invites strategic manipulation by rent-seeking competitors, and
increases the costs of antitrust litigation. Antitrust law can afford to frame
underinclusive rules governing exclusionary behavior in private cases because
the high likelihood of detection of such behavior combined with the substantial
costs of an adverse judgment will deter most dominant firms from straying too
close to the line drawn by the rule. The same concerns hold, although to a
lesser degree, in private collaborative conduct cases where only consumers are
likely to have standing. The risk of chilling efficient conduct remains, although
the risk of strategic misuse diminishes.
Rules are especially appropriate when used as immunizing devices for
commercial behavior with ambiguous but usually positive social welfare
consequences that could otherwise be challenged under the rule of reason. The
antitrust agencies have encouraged the use of such safe-harbors for public
litigation, for example in announcing that they usually will not challenge
intellectual property licensing agreements where the licensor and licensee
account for less than twenty percent of the relevant market. 196 Other potential
safe-harbors include market share thresholds for tying, exclusive dealing,
monopolization, and vertical restraint claims; an absolute "above cost" defense
for predatory pricing, primary line price discrimination, and bundled
discounting claims; and per se legality for new product design. Conduct falling
outside these or other safe harbors would then be subject to rule of reason
treatment.
Few categories of business behavior warrant per se prohibition in rule-like
form-perhaps price fixing, bid rigging, patent fraud, and a few others. But
rules can also be used to predetermine individual issues in litigation. For
example, a conclusive presumption that a patent about which a patentee has
195. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text (discussing lower courts' exclusionary
conduct cases in which the courts rejected categorical rules).
196. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property

§ 4.3 (1995), http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
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brought an infringement lawsuit confers market power may be useful in
simplifying tying litigation, 197 even though it does not by itself resolve whether
liability should be imposed. Even where courts believe that ultimate liability
issues should be left to rule of reason balancing, crafting rules to govern
individual issues may reduce the costs of litigation, increase predictability, and
minimize the risk of adjudicatory error and arbitrariness.
Standards are paradigmatically most appropriate to govern public
enforcement seeking prospective relief.198 Such cases pose the least risk of
overdeterrence and strategic misuse of antitrust and maximize the benefit of
detailed, case-specific review. To the extent that such cases are heard by
specialized administrative law judges in the Federal Trade Commission, they
also lower the cost of promulgating the applicable legal command, since the
judges can apply experience from prior cases at low cost. Standards minimize
the likelihood of special interest capture of the enforcement agencies by
pushing decision-making down the legal and administrative hierarchy.
To capture these considerations in a more concrete way, it may be useful
to imagine a set of binary conceptual pairings where one value in each paring
correlates more positively with rules and the other with standards, as shown in
Table A.
Table A

Public litigation
Prohibitory determinant
Injunction
Idiosyncratic conduct
Collusive conduct

Private litigation
Immunizing determinant
Damages
Archetypal conduct
Exclusionary conduct

In choosing between rules and standards in antitrust, a court should be
guided by the extent to which these various factors line up or juxtapose in that
particular case. Not all of the factors are of equal weight,199 but at a minimum
197. See Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support ofRespondent, Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329) (arguing that the market
power presumption in patent tying cases is important for several reasons).
198. The distinction I make between public and private enforcement is consistent with the
Supreme Court's view that the Federal Trade Commission has prophylactic authority to create
antitrust norms beyond those under the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,
322 (1966) (stating that "this power of the Commission [to go beyond the bounds of the Sherman
Act] was emphatically stated in FTC v. Motion PictureAdv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953)").
199. For example, the distinction between collusive and exclusionary conduct is predicated on
the concern that competitors will exploit the indeterminacy of standards for anticompetitive
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they are useful in identifying the paradigmatic cases for applying rules or
standards. Thus, for example, a competitor action seeking damages for
predatory pricing, which is a frequently litigated practice, should be subjected
to immunizing determinants in the form of a rule since this case lines up all five
rule factors (private, immunizing, damages, exclusionary, archetypal).200
Conversely, in a government action seeking an injunction against future
participation in a potentially collusive agreement of a kind not often observed,
it would be appropriate to create liability under a standard-based approach since
that case would line up all five standard factors (public, prohibitory, injunctive,
collusive, idiosyncratic). 0 1 In cases where some factors point to standards and
others to rules, the court would need to identify which of the factors was most
relevant to its particular case and assign weight to the different factors based on
the circumstances.
V. Non-Efficiency Considerations
Antitrust may be concerned primarily with economic efficiency, but the
rules versus standards debate comprehends other values and concerns as well.
This final Part considers the extent to which reasons other than efficiency might
affect the choice between rules and standards in the antitrust domain. In
particular, it considers the role of both moral and expressive concerns and
concludes that both have some limited importance to antitrust jurisprudence.
A. DistributiveJustice, PersonalAutonomy, and Equal Treatment
A significant part of the rules versus standards debate has an ideologically
charged flavor. Libertarians like Friedrich Hayek and Richard Epstein have
advocated a rule-based approach to law, believing that ex ante specification of
bright-line liability criteria will minimize the aggrandizement of governmental

advantage. In a case brought by the government, this is unlikely to be a concern. Thus, this
conceptual pairing is only relevant in private actions.
200. This roughly corresponds with the justification for the rule ofper se legality for prices
above marginal cost. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, PredatoryPricingandRelated
PracticesUnder Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 709-10 (1975) (stating
that a monopolist's practice of pricing "above marginal cost will not eliminate equally efficient
rivals or potential entrants").
201. This may describe the Polygram case. See supranotes 50-58 and accompanying text
(discussing how the FTC and the D.C. Circuit court evaluated the Polygram case in flexible
terms rather than in fixed categories).
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authority. 2°2 Conversely, critical legal studies adherents like Duncan Kennedy
and Morton Horwitz have attacked the structure of rules as entrenching the
inequitable status quo and allowing manipulation by the wealthy and
privileged.20 3
These arguments seem largely off the mark when it comes to antitrust.
While the choice of particular antitrust rules or standards, or the mixture of the
two, may have important implications for the distribution of wealth or the
degree of governmental interference with consensual market transactions, it
seems difficult to predict ex ante whether a generally rule-based or standardbased approach will be more interventionist when it comes to competition
policy. The earliest antitrust decisions pitted interventionist rules against
permissive standards.2 °4 When conservative federal judges used the antitrust
laws to suppress the labor movement, Congress responded with legislative rules
categorically immunizing strikes from the Sherman Act. 20 5 Antitrust opposition
202. See EPsTEtN, SIMPLE RULES, supra note 11, at 21 (stating that the book's purpose "is
to develop a set of simple rules capable of handling the most complex set of social relations
imaginable"); FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (advocating an approach
whereby "government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehandrules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge"); see also FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE CoNsTrrtrnoN OF LIBERTY, 205-14 (1960)
(explaining what the rule of law means-"that government must never coerce an individual
except in the enforcement of a known rule.").
203. See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 1737-51, 1753-56 (discussing rule-based law);
Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An UnqualifiedHuman Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566
(1977) (reviewing DOUGLAS HAY, ALBON'S FATAL TREE (1975) and E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND
HuNTERs (1975)) ("By promoting procedural justice [the rule of law] enables the shrewd, the
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage.").
204. Compare Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,239 (1918) (applying a
per se rule of illegality), with United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340-41
(1897) (applying the rule of reason applied in favor of defendants). In fairness, ChicagoBoard
of Trade could be considered "progressive" insofar as it permitted a practice that allowed
smaller, probably less efficient, rural dealers to participate in the market. See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 44-45 (1978) (describing Justice Brandeis' majority opinion in
ChicagoBoard of Trade as sympathetic to the smaller traders).
205. Congress initially responded to use of antitrust law to enjoin strikes by providing in
the Clayton Act that "[tihe labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce"
and that labor organizations are not to be "construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws" and by prohibiting federal courts to enjoin strikes.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (2001); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2001). The Supreme Court continued to sanction
injunctions against labor picketing. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,330 (1921) (finding
that the court may grant an injunction to the employer in a labor dispute); Am. Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 202-06 (1921) (finding that an injunction is
appropriate where the strikers' means of persuasion is not peaceful); Duplex Printing Press Co.
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,464 (1921) (finding that the right to an injunction exists, and "must be
determined as of the time of the hearing"). In response to the Supreme Court's actions,
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to mergers,20 6 collaborative restraints of trade, and exclusionary practices
reached its zenith under the Warren Court's rule-based approach which
restricted concentrations of industrial power and favored non-economic values
and small business interests.20 7 The movement toward standards was at least in
part the work of the Chicago School's laissez-faire project in the 1970s and

1980s. While some of the recent exclusionary practices cases have rejected
rules that would have immunized defendants in favor of open-ended standards
more likely to result in a plaintiff's verdict, the history of antitrust jurisprudence
generally suggests the opposite tendency than that suggested by Duncan and
Horwitz: Rules have often been more favorable to antitrust interventions in
208
market conduct and standards more favorable to business interests.
It is also hard to make the case that rules systematically favor powerful
industrial interests that understand the rules and their loopholes and best know
how to, and can afford to, manipulate the system. Antitrust law is often
enforced publicly by expert, motivated, and relatively well-financed staff at the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. Even on the private
side, the treble damages remedy, 20 9 unilateral fee-shifting in favor of
plaintiffs, 2 10 and the magnitude of recoverable damages (often in the hundreds

of millions or even billions of dollars) has created a competent, motivated, and
well-financed plaintiffs' bar. In cases of exclusionary conduct, the injured
Congress passed an act which categorically prohibited federal injunctions against peaceful labor
activities. See Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (2001) ("No court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any... injunction in any case involving... any labor
dispute [under certain circumstances].").
206. In a succession of opinions, the Warren Court rejected merger after merger, creating
the impression that it was following a rule of per se illegality for mergers causing an increase in
market concentration. See Arthur Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave: The
Revolution vs. the Counterrevolution,66 N.C. L. REv. 931, 949 (1988) (describing "Warren
Court merger decisions [as] virtual per se holdings").
207. A classic statement of the Warren Court's small-business preference appears in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)
("[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection
of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization."); see also Eleanor M. Fox, The
Battle for the Soul ofAntitrust, 75 CAL. L. REv. 917, 919, 922-23 (1987) (giving a generally
positive account of the Warren Court's approach to antitrust).
208. This is not to say that, going forward, there is any particular reason to believe that
rules will be applied in a more interventionist way than standards.
209. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (a) (2001) ("[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.., and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.").
210. Id.
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party is liable to be a corporation and not a poorly educated individual. Even
where the harm is distributed across a wide number of consumers, the class
action mechanism-which is often favored in antitrust cases involving uniform
21 1
conduct by the defendants affecting prices to a large number ofconsumers
allows aggregation of claims in a way that levels the playing field.
Of course, it is possible to view the entire antitrust project as a farce
designed to conceal the deep inequities of capitalism.2 12 But if that is the case,
the choice between rules and standards does not matter much and the
conversation needs to be about deeper questions of resource allocation,
property ownership, labor rights, industrial policy, and law as a means of social
control. Antitrust-whether based on rules or standards-assumes the
normativity of free enterprise, industrial competition, and demand-based
allocation of social resources. Within those parameters, rules are generally no
more oppressive to the disadvantaged than standards.
On the other side of the aisle, libertarian Richard Epstein advocates
"simple rules for a complex world" in order to curb the power of the state.2 13
When it comes to antitrust, Epstein envisions a set of narrow rules-perhaps214a
common-law refusal to enforce price-fixing agreements and little more.
Epstein envisions not simpler antitrust but virtually no antitrust. 215 The
211. Federal judges are fond of reporting that class certification is favored in antitrust
cases. See, e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 232 F.R.D. 346,350 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
("Courts have stressed that price-fixing cases are appropriate for class certification."); Daniel v.
Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 269 F. Supp. 2d 159, 188-89 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Questions
regarding class certification should be resolved in favor of and not against the maintenance of
class action."); In re Indust. Diamonds Antitrust Litig., 167 F.R.D. 374, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[B]ecause of the important role that class actions play in the private enforcement of the
antitrust statutes, courts resolve doubts about whether a class should be created in favor of
certification.").
212. See, e.g., William L. Letwin, Congressandthe Sherman AntitrustLaw 1887-1890,23
U. CHi.L. REv. 221, 221 (1955) (reporting that some observers maintained that the Sherman
Act was a fraud because Congress was dominated by "many of the ...industrial magnates most
vulnerable to real antitrust legislation") (quoting M. FAINSOD & L. GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 450 (1941)). Senator Sherman, the Act's sponsor, admonished that
Congress "must heed [the public's] appeal or be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the
nihilist." See also 21 Cong. Rec. 2460, 2460 (1890) (suggesting that the goal of the Sherman
Act was to appease the public rather than to achieve significant wealth redistribution).
213. See EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES, supra note 11, at 127 (arguing that a "simpleperse rule
that regards all competitive injury as non-compensable" is better than "a complex body of
antitrust law").
214. Id.at 123-27; see also Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing
Field: The New Antitrust Paradox,72 U. CHI. L. Rev. 49, 49 (2005) (concluding "that antitrust
law should abandon its attack... on unilateral practices altogether").
215. See EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES, supra note 11, at 123-27 (arguing for less complex
antitrust law).
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argument forminimalist antitrust policy does not have that much to do with
whether antitrust policy should be formulated as rules or standards if it is
broadly formulated. As we have seen, in the antitrust realm it is possible for
rules to be either interventionist or laissez-faire (compare the Colgate and Dr.
Miles rules)."' If antitrust law is going to address business practices like
vertical restraints of trade, predatory pricing, or horizontal collusion, it is not
clear ex ante that rules will be less interventionist than standards.
Eric Posner argues that rules are to be favored "ifwe care about autonomy,
because standards, more so than rules, encourage self-reinforcing conformity to
the imagined goals of the state rather than actions that reflect one's authentic
values and interests. 2 1 7 It is not clear to what extent this argument has force as
applied to antitrust law, which generally applies to large corporate actors rather
than individuals. The "authentic values and interests" of corporations are
generally profit maximization for the benefit of shareholders,21 8 and it is hard to
state categorically ex ante whether rules or standards are more likely to
maximize shareholder profits.
Another political-moral concern that often arises in the rules versus
standards debate concerns equality. Rules tend to create formal equality by
eliminating arbitrariness and inconsistency in adjudication, but the bright lines
drawn by rules sometimes create substantive inequality by lumping together
people who are not similarly situated.21 9 On the other hand, standards can
conceal arbitrariness in decision-making because it is always possible to point
to some ostensibly relevant factor differentiating two otherwise similar cases.2 20
It has been a long time since anyone has thought about antitrust in explicitly
moral terms, 22 ' but whatever the content of antitrust, courts must make some
216. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text (arguing that the doctrinal dualism
between the two rules means that slight differences in the challenged conduct are determinative
of the conduct's legality).
217. Eric Posner, supra note 11, at 117.
218. Indeed, managers and boards of directors are ordinarily assumed to have a fiduciary
obligation to pursue these goals single-mindedly. But see Einer Elhauge, SacrificingCorporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763-76 (2005) (arguing that corporate

law gives managers the discretion to sacrifice shareholder profits infavor of the public interest).
219. See Sullivan, supranote 11, at 62-69 (discussing the arguments for and against rules);
DAVIS, supranote 11, at v (arguing that "the greatest... injustice occurs at the discretion end of
the scale, where rules and principles provide little... guidance, where emotions of deciding
officers may affect what they do, where political ...favoritism may influence decisions, and
where the imperfections of human nature are often rejected in the choices made.").
220. See POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 11, at 44 (discussing the
differences between standards and rules).
221. No less an authority than Herbert Hovenkamp informs us that "antitrust has no moral
content." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607,
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effort to apply it evenly. The risk of arbitrary and inconsistent results in a
standard-based system increases with the complexity of the law administered
and the unsophistication of the ultimate decision-maker. Much of antitrust law
is highly complex, and juries-which are more likely to be entrusted with
decisions under standards than under rules 22-are often in over their heads in
economically complicated antitrust cases. These factors create the conditions
for adjudicatory arbitrariness. Part III.C further discussed the allocation of
decision-making responsibilities that comes with the choice of rules or
standards, suggesting that standards tend to push more ultimate decisionmaking onto jurors. If we are concerned about disparate treatment of similarly
situated parties, there is something to be said for maintaining antitrust rules.
B. Maintainingthe Expressive Core
In thinking about the optimal specification of legal commands, it is
important to keep in mind how the legal commands will communicate the core
values of the relevant legal enterprise both to regulated entities and the general
public. Law does not merely regulate conduct, it also generates social norms.223
As Thurman Arnold wrote a few years before transforming the Antitrust
Division into a modem, aggressive agency, law plays an important role in
expressing "contradictory social values., 224 Nowhere is this more evident than
in a case like United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,22S which Arnold
pressed on behalf of the United States. The "dancing partner" arrangement
609 (2003); see also HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supranote 14, at 10, 54 (stating
that antitrust is only concerned with the economic, not the moral, implications of conduct). But
see Alan J. Meese, Liberty andAntitrust in the FormativeEra, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1,86-87 (1999)
(describing turn-of-the-century view that prices at a competitive level were part of a "natural"
order and that deviations from that price through monopolistic or collusive conduct were a
moral wrong).
222. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text (explaining that while framing
antitrust law as a standard requires the court to give greater deference to experts within the
antitrust enforcement agencies, it also requires jurors to apply complex economic facts).
223. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181,
2185 (1996) (describing the meaning of norms as "[c]onforming when everyone else is
conforming. . . doing what others are doing..., [and] behaving appropriately"); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin,Development, andRegulationof Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338,352-55
(1997) (describing norm origin and its relevance to the law); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2024-25 (1996) (discussing "how legal
statements might be designed to change social norms").
224.

THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 130 (1935).

225. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see also supranote
21 and accompanying text (describing the Socony case in further detail).
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challenged by the Government had been instigated by the very same federal
government under the National Industrial Recovery Act, or "NIRA. ' 2 6 After
the Supreme Court invalidated key portions of the NIRA,227 the Department of
Justice turned on the dancing partner program as a price fix. 228 The shift from
federal instigation to federal condemnation happened suddenly and it was left
to the federal courts to work out the contradiction. Justice Douglas found that
solution in the enunciation of a sweeping per se prohibition on price fixing, a
decree so strong that the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct in light of
the regulatory apparatus of a few weeks earlier was utterly irrelevant. 29
Although antitrust practitioners have come to think of antitrust as a
generally bureaucratic discipline at the public enforcement level and a complex
field for expert lawyers and economists at the private enforcement level,
antitrust will always symbolize to the public at large certain values of
capitalism and its restraints.2 30 Even if most lawyers, judges, or business
people do not think of antitrust in moral terms,2 3' the enforcement agencies go
out of their way to depict core antitrust violations as malum in se. In press

releases, the Attorney General solemnly informs the public that price fixing

"robs American consumers of the benefit of competitive prices,"2 32 just as
surely as if the price-fixers had walked into a bank with a drawn gun. If price
fixing is to be analogized (when convenient) to robbery, it will do no good to
explain that this is only true at the end of the collaborative restraints of trade
226. See Socony, 310 U.S. at 171-74 (using the facts of Socony to explain the partner
principle).
227. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431-33 (1935) (striking down the first
section of the NIRA as lacking the required findings of fact); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-51 (1935) (striking down those portions of the NIRA that
relate to "the hours and wages of those employed in defendant's slaughterhouse markets").
228. See Daniel A. Crane, Story of UnitedStates v. Socony- Vacuum: Hot OilandAntitrust
in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor Fox & Daniel A. Crane, eds.)
(Foundation Press, forthcoming 2007) (describing the Justice Department's behavior).
229. See Socony, 310 U.S. at 221-22 (dismissing the governmentally mandated origins of
the distress gasoline program). Justice Douglas said: "Though employees of the government
may have known of those programs and winked at them or tacitly approved them, no immunity
would have thereby been obtained." Id. at 226.
230. See Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051,
1051 (1979) (reminding readers that antitrust has always had, and will always have, a political
content).
231. See supranote 221 (stating Hovenkamp's opinion of antitrust law, which reflects the
opinions of most lawyers, judges, or business people).
232. Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay $300
Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13, 2005), (quoting Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzalez) availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2005/
212002.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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continuum where the defendant has failed to rebut a prima facie assumption
that the conduct in question causes social welfare losses. Price fixing is only
"robbery" if price fixing is prohibited-period.
Simply articulated rules about what is categorically permitted are also
necessary to express the competition preference of capitalism. Rules are
needed as bookends to the range of possible legal outcomes. If price fixing is
categorically prohibited, then perhaps refusing to collaborate with competitors
should be categorically allowed.233 This allows antitrust to be reduced to a
maxim like "competition, not collusion" which expresses the heart of the
enterprise to the laity even if antitrust insiders experience the rules as somewhat
fuzzier.
Antitrust law needs to maintain a rule-expressed core not only for the
general public but also for the constituencies whose behavior it regulates.
Business schools seem to teach very little about antitrust. 234 Larry White
reports that nine leading business school microeconomics textbooks devoted a
total of 64 pages out of 6,421 to antitrust principles.235 Business people
frequently profess surprise-real or feigned-when told that their conduct
violated the antitrust laws.236 If all of antitrust breaks down into amorphous
standards, it will be even easier for business schools to shunt all of antitrust off
to the lawyers.
In order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust law, the Supreme
Court should take care to ensure that, even in a generally standard-based
system, at least a few principles of antitrust law remain enunciated as blackletter rules. One could imagine a canon of antitrust rules along the following
lines: (1) If you fix prices with your competitor, you will go to jail; (2) Do not
233. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,40810 (2004) (coming close to ruling that firms never have an obligation to cooperate with their
competitors, while avoiding overruling Aspen Skiing which did recognize such an obligation
based on the facts of that case).
234. See Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights.fromStrategicManagement, 47 N.Y.L.S.
L. REv. 67, 73 (2003) ("Most strategic management texts pay scant attention to antitrust law.");
Lawrence J. White, Microeconomics in MBA Programs: What 's Thought, What's Taught, 47
N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 87, 91-95 (2003) ("[A]ntitrust issues usually receive only passing attention in
such [business] courses.").
235. Id.at 94-95.
236. Even in a clear-cut example like the Sotheby's-Christie's price-fixing case, some of
the high ranking executives involved expressed surprise that their agreements setting seller's
commissions were illegal. See CHRISTOPHER MASON, THE ART OF THE STEAL: INSIDE THE
SOTHEBY's-CRISTIE'S AUCTION HOUSE SCANDAL 205 (2004) (observing how one executive
involved in the collusion "dismissed the suggestion of impropriety as mere nonsense"). One
does not have to believe their protestations to appreciate the value of clearly delineated rules in
removing the excuse.
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divide markets with your competitors-you must compete; (3) You have no
obligation to cooperate with your competitors; (4) You may set your price as
high or as low as you please, but not below your cost; (5) If your market share
exceeds 70%, you are a monopolist-watch yourselfl These or other similar
principles could be enunciated as simple rules, thus maintaining the expressive
core of antitrust, even if practitioners realize that the rules are not as
determinate as they appear on paper.

VI. Conclusion
In many ways, antitrust's transition from a categorical ex ante approach to
a more open-ended, multi-factor, and post hoc approach resembles the
development of Anglo-American common law. The system started with a
number of relatively narrow and formalistic rules (compare the per se rules to
the common law writs); eventually the needs of the relevant constituency
outgrew the boundaries of the rules; the courts essentially froze the rules and
refused to create new categories; new modes of adjudication were required and
found their place in a flexible system of "equity;" equity and law competed for
some time until the flexibility of equity overcame the rigidity of law; eventually
law and equity collapsed into a single system, with the spirit of equity
predominating.237 To a large extent, this narrative describes where we have
been, and where we appear to be headed, in antitrust adjudication.
It is easy to recount a rules-to-standards story as a saga of progress, and
there is much to be said in favor of antitrust law's transition toward standards,
particularly because there was much to be said against many of the old rules.
But the deficiencies of the old rules should not mislead us to believe that
antitrust standards are always superior to antitrust rules or that a system of
flexible standards can be maintained without a core of bright-line rules. As
noted at the outset, the legal pendulum usually swings back and forth between
rules and standards as the disadvantages of the prevailing regime lead to calls
for reform. The best way to prevent such cycles and maintain long-term
flexibility where it most matters is to preserve a rule-based structure for
significant portions of the antitrust endeavor.

237.

See Davis, supranote 11, at 19 (describing how the rigid application of rules and the

"resulting injustice" led to the development of courts of equity in the English legal system);
FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 156

(1910) (A.H. Chaytor &W.J. Whittaker eds.) ("[W]e ought to think of the relationship between
common law and equity not as that between two conflicting systems, but as that between code
and supplement, that between text and gloss.").

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 49 (2007)
In deciding between rules and standards, it is critical to keep in mind the
remedial and legal-cultural settings in which antitrust law intersects with
litigants and prospective litigants. The trend toward open-ended rule of reason
analysis makes good sense when applied to the Federal Trade Commission or
Department of Justice when they seek to alter future behavior. It makes less
sense when applied to treble damages actions by rent-seeking private litigants,
which raises the danger of overdeterrence and strategic misuse of the
unpredictability created by multi-factored standards. There is still an important
place in antitrust jurisprudence for defensive safe harbors formed by bright-line
rules. And, in order to maintain the expressive core of antitrust, a few per se
prohibitions and per se rules of legality should be maintained.
Justice Marshall was wrong to view economic analysis of industrial
practices as an untamable wild, but he was right to recognize the advantages of
rules. We do not have to return to Topco's rigidity to preserve a space for
dynamic rules in antitrust adjudication. 38

238. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) (embracing a per se
rule violation approach in antitrust litigation and rejecting "the notion that naked restraints of
trade are to be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed
to increase competition").

